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Adam Smith Assaults Ma Bell with His
Invisible Hands: Divestiture,
Deregulation, and the Need for a
New Telecommunications Policyt
by PAUL STEPHEN DEMPSEY*
The Parable Of The Great Fish
And it came to pass that God looked down upon the Great
Fish and inquired, "You are a wise old fish. Tell me, what is
this thing, water, in which ye swim?"
And the fish thought for a moment, and replied, "I can
neither taste, nor smell, nor see it. I know not what water is,
Oh Lord."
And many months passed.
And lo, one day black clouds rolled across the sky and blot-
ted out the Sun, and there came a great squall, and a tempest,
and a storm which washed the Great Fish onto the land.
The Great Fish struggled mightily, but the waves grew calm
and the tide receded and left him landward.
And as the clouds parted, and the Sun's rays began to bake
his scales, the Great Fish looked skyward and said, "Dear
God, I know now what is 'water'."'
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I
Introduction
Without amendment of the legislative policy which directed
American telecommunications for half a century, 2 an overzeal-
ous Justice Department and a maverick federal judge disman-
tled American Telephone and Telegraph (AT&T), the North
American telecommunications giant, scattering its dismem-
bered body across the land. The Federal Communications
Commission (FCC) supplemented divestiture with partial de-
regulation.4 Like the Great Fish, Americans now bask in the
sun of divestiture and deregulation.
During the past decade, neo-classical economists have stood
at center stage in the White House.' They gazed into their
crystal ball and saw wondrous things: if the dead hand of reg-
ulation was amputated, then Adam Smith's invisible hands
2. 47 U.S.C. § 151 (enacted June 19, 1934, commonly known as the Communica-
tions Act of 1934).
3. Ronald R. Carr and James P. Denvir, both attorneys from the Antitrust Di-
vision of the Department of Justice, organized the government's attack resulting in
AT&T's divestiture of the Bell system. Judge Harold Greene's famous (or infamous)
opinion calling for the breakup can be found at United States v. AT&T, 552 F. Supp.
131 (D.D.C. 1982).
4. See infra notes 151-57.
5. The most prominent economic advisors to the White House in the past dec-
ade were Milton Friedman, Martin Feldstein, Alan Greenspan, and Alfred Kahn.
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would reach out from his grave and bring perfect competition
to the land, allowing us to grow and prosper in a Camelot of
allocative efficiency.6 Thus, they tailored fine garments for
Presidents Carter and Reagan, garments of divestiture and de-
regulation whose beauty only the very wise could perceive.
This Article begins with a description of the historical devel-
opment of and justifications for regulation. It proceeds to an
analysis of the legal and political developments which ushered
in divestiture and partial deregulation, as well as their princi-
pal empirical results-the economic and social costs and bene-
fits of the new regime. Because the path taken is as important
as the results achieved, this analysis is directed at both the
means and the ends of divestiture and deregulation.
The Article examines the three legal regimes that govern
telecommunications today-Judge Harold Greene, the FCC,
and the state Public Utility Commissions (PUCs)-and dis-
cusses Congress' failure to step forward and shoulder its share
of the responsibility. Finally, this Article will endeavor to
identify the proper objectives of a national telecommunica-
tions policy and the means for accomplishing such goals.
America is now faced with a public policy dilemma of tre-
mendous consequences. Neither the extremes of laissez faire
nor rigid governmental regulation are desirable alternatives.
While all the King's horses and all the King's men can never
put the Bell System back together again, we need to move for-
ward to a new blending of enlightened regulation and healthy
competition. The time has come for Congress to amend the
Communications Act of 1934, setting forth a new national tele-
communications policy reflecting the contemporary needs of
the nation. This Article will attempt to identify the principal
components of public policy in government regulation of this
important infrastructure industry.
6. See e.g., Friedman, Free Markets and Free Speech, 10 HARV. J.L. & PUB.
POL'Y 1 (1987); M. FRIEDMAN, CAPITALISM AND FREEDOM: PROBLEMS & PROSPECTS
(1974); FELDSTEIN, MARTIN & AUERBACH, A HANDBOOK OF PUBLIC ECONOMICS
(1985); FELDSTEIN & MARTIN, THE AMERICAN ECONOMY IN TRANSITION (1980);
GREENSPAN, WEAPONS AGAINST INFLATION (1979).
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II
The Genesis and Evolution of Economic
Regulation
The rate of technological innovation in telecommunications
has been robust. America has made spectacular strides in
long-distance, satellite, and computer communications.7 Estab-
lishing and enforcing a stable regulatory regime in this tech-
nologically dynamic industry has proven problematic.8
Compounding the difficulties has been the metamorphosis of
antitrust policy as it applies to telecommunications. The
evolution of contemporary technology and the metamorphosis
of antitrust law makes the study of regulation in the telecom-
munications industry a timely subject.
Traditionally, AT&T was regulated as a natural monopoly
to facilitate the public policy objective of "universal service"-
the notion that all Americans should have reasonably priced
access to a telecommunications network.9 In recent years,
however, government policy has evolved to encourage compe-
tition in telecommunications markets. 10 The contemporary
movement's zenith was the largest corporate dismantling in
antitrust history-AT&T's divestiture of the Bell operating
companies in 1984.1"
Although the Pandora's box of divestiture was opened ab-
ruptly, deregulation was not suddenly thrust upon us.
Throughout the past half-century, the pendulum has swung
between lesser and greater degrees of regulation and
deregulation.
A. Origins of the Bell System (Natural) Monopoly
On March 10, 1876, human speech was first sent by wire
when Alexander Graham Bell spoke these few words into his
new invention, the telephone: "Mr. Watson, come here, I want
7. See, e.g., Brushing Off the Ash of Divestiture's Pyre, INSIGHT, Apr. 17, 1989,
at 8 [hereinafter Divestiture's Pyre].
8. See Knieps & Spiller, Regulating By Partial Deregulation: The Ease of Tele-
communications, 35 ADMIN. L. REv. 391 (1983).
9. See Federal Communications Act of 1934, 47 U.S.C. § 151 (1983).
10. See Marks, Regulation and Deregulation in the United States and Other
Countries, 25 JURIMETRICS J. 5 (1984).
11. United States v. AT&T, 552 F. Supp. 131 (D.D.C. 1982), aff'd, 460 U.S. 1001
(1983).
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you. '12 The world has not been the same since. Bell's patents
on the telephone (since referred to as the most valuable ever
issued) were perfected that year.13 The American Telephone
and Telegraph Company was formally established on Febru-
ary 28, 1895.14
By the turn of the century, the Bell patents had expired,
allowing any firm to manufacture telephones and provide ser-
vice. The growth of independent telephone companies began
to threaten AT&T's dominance. By 1907, the Bell system had
3,132,000 telephones in service, compared to approximately
2,987,000 for the independent companies. AT&T responded by
acquiring many of the independents, purchasing a substantial
interest in Western Union, and refusing to allow others to con-
nect to its facilities. The then-president of AT&T, Theodore
Vail, pressed for universal service and government regulation
to curb what he saw as wasteful competition. This approach
was summarized in the Bell System's motto, "One Policy, One
System, Universal Service." With the promulgation of the
12. This technological breakthrough was preceded by the invention of the tele-
graph, which laid the foundation for development of the telephone. In the 1830s,
Samuel F.B. Morse demonstrated that signals could be transmitted by wire. On May
24, 1844, he transmitted the first message, "What hath God wrought?", with a system
of dots and dashes that still bears his name. Soon, Western Union Telegraph Com-
pany became America's dominant communications firm. C. PHILLIPS, JR., THE REG-
ULATION OF PUBLIC UTILITIES 618 (1984) [hereinafter C. PHILLIPS, JR.].
13. Id. at 621. But in 1876, Western Union declined an invitation to purchase the
patent for $100,000 and began to compete with Bell in developing telephone ex-
changes of its own under the patents of Elisha Gray and Thomas Edison. Bell sued
for patent infringement in 1878 and the suit settled the following year. Under the
agreement, Bell was given an exclusive 17-year license to use Western Union's pat-
ents, and agreed to pay 20% of the cost of any new patents Western Union developed
or acquired. Bell further agreed to purchase Western Union's telephone system and
to pay Western Union 20% of the rentals or royalties it received for the use of its
licenses. Bell brought numerous other patent infringement actions against other
companies. These were consolidated, and Bell's patents were upheld by the U.S.
Supreme Court in 1888. Id. at 623-28.
14. The Bell Telephone Company was formed in 1877. The first commercial tel-
ephone exchange was established in New Haven, Connecticut, in 1878, and the first
telephone directory was published later that year. In 1881, Bell purchased Jay
Gould's interest in Western Electric, which became the sole supplier of Bell tele-
phones and equipment. M. Irwin, The Telecommunications Industry in THE STRUC-
TURE OF AMERICAN INDUSTRY, 261, 262 (W. Adams 7th ed. 1986). AT&T became the
parent company of Bell Telephone. Telecommunications Through the Years, TELE-
PHONE ENGINEER & MGMT., June 1, 1984, at 244-50. Bell Telephone Laboratories
("Bell Labs") were organized in 1925 to consolidate research and development activi-
ties of the company. Centralization of research in Bell Labs and standardization of
equipment produced by Western Electric facilitated telecommunications growth and
development.
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Mann-Elkins Act of 1910, AT&T came within the jurisdiction
of the Interstate Commerce Commission (ICC). 15
The independent telephone companies complained of
AT&T's monopolistic activities, urging federal prosecution of
AT&T under the Sherman Act.16 In the Kingsbury Commit-
ment of 1913, AT&T pledged that it would not purchase com-
peting telephone companies without ICC approval, would
dispose of its stock in Western Union, and would allow all in-
dependents to interconnect with its toll facilities. 7
Although AT&T was forced to reduce its monopolistic activ-
ities, the company remained a monopoly throughout much of
the nation. In the ensuing years, the government created bar-
riers to AT&T's competition, furthering the company's
interests.8
B. The Federal Communications Commission and "Universal
Service"
During the great depression of the 1930s, Congress promul-
gated the Communications Act of 1934, which created the Fed-
eral Communications Commission. 9 The FCC was given
jurisdiction to regulate interstate communications.20 Recogniz-
ing that the widespread availability of telecommunications
services at reasonable rates was essential to the American
economy and welfare, Congress stated that telephone compa-
nies were to be "common carriers," and to provide adequate
service to all subscribers within their service territories.
Under a statutory policy of "universal service," the FCC
15. Irwin, supra note 14, at 263.
16. Shooshan, The Bell Breakup, in DISCONNECTING BELL, THE IMPACT OF THE
AT&T DIVESTITURE 8, 9-11 (H. Shooshan III ed. 1984).
17. Id. at 11. In exchange, the government informally agreed to "anoint" a na-
tional telephone monopoly, subject to federal regulation. S. COLL, THE DEAL OF THE
CENTURY, THE BREAKUP OF AT&T 58 (1986) [hereinafter S. COLL].
18. Within a few years of the Kingsbury Commitment, an Attorney General's
opinion allowed for consolidation of local companies into a single system, and legisla-
tion was passed authorizing the Interstate Commerce Commission to approve the
consolidation of telephone company holdings by acquisitions, with the intention to
immunize such consolidations from attack under the antitrust laws. State and fed-
eral regulators were creating barriers to the entry of new competitors. Shooshan,
supra note 16, at 11-12.
19. The Federal Communications Commission became the agency of the Federal
Radio Commission, established in 1929 to regulate the air waves.
20. 47 U.S.C. § 151. Note that the Act regulated interstate communications but
left regulation of intrastate communications to the respective state PUCs. See 47
U.S.C. § 152(b).
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would promote the, availability of telephone service to every
community in the country. This required both a technologi-
cally unified system and low rates for local service, ensured by
public utility regulation.2'
C. Universal Service and Cross-Subsidization
The statutory concept of universal service sought to provide,
so far as possible, to all people of the United States a rapid,
efficient, Nation-wide, and world-wide wire and radio commu-
nication service with adequate facilities at reasonable charges,
for the purpose of the national defense, for the purpose of
promoting safety of life and property through the use of wire
and radio communication.... 22
Accordingly, each company offering telephone service was re-
quired to satisfy reasonable requests for service within the
scope of its operating territories.23
The FCC has jurisdiction over the interstate long-distance
services, while the state PUCs regulate intrastate long-dis-
tance and local services. Beginning in the 1950s, technological
innovations reduced the cost of providing long-distance ser-
vice, while the cost of providing local service began to in-
crease. The telephone companies' requests for local rate
increases were repeatedly denied by the PUCs. The denials
were based on both the telephone company's unpopularity and
on the public policy objective of ensuring universal service.24
Instead of granting the local rate increases, the regulatory
21. See Comment, Storming the AT&T Fortress: Can the FCC Deregulate Compet-
itive Common Carrier Services?, 32 FED. CoMM. L.J. 205, 205-07 (1980). See also
Comment, An Assessment of State and Federal Jurisdiction to Regulate Access
Charges After the AT&T Divestiture, 15 B.Y.U. L. REV. 376, 384-87 (1983); Note, The
Proposed Deregulation of Domestic Common Carrier Telecommunications, 69 CALIF.
L. REV. 455, 464-66 (1981).
For many years, the FCC used the "universal service" mandate to discourage com-
petition in the industry. It also believed that competition was not in the public inter-
est because of the "natural monopoly" characteristics of the industry. A natural
monopoly exists when a single large firm can produce an industry's total output
most efficiently and realize long-run economies of scale. In an environment where
there is a natural monopoly, competition can be wasteful and more costly because of
the attendant duplication. Note, supra, at 466.
.22. Federal Communication Act of 1934, 47 U.S.C. § 151 (1983). See also Access
Charges: MTS and WATS Market Structure, 48 Fed. Reg. 10329 (March 11, 1983).
23. 47 U.S.C. § 201 (1983).
24. The policy of drawing revenues from the long-distance market to subsidize
the local markets could most efficiently be accomplished under the umbrella of eco-
nomic regulation. Thus, based on the societal desire to expand services to areas the
market would not serve on its own initiative, the telephone service industry was
[Vol. 11:527
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agencies adopted a form of rate averaging called "value of ser-
vice" pricing. Under this system, users who were less price-
elastic25 paid more, and users who were more price-elastic paid
less.26 Consequently, commercial and long-distance rates were
set higher, and local rates were set below marginal cost.2 7
Moreover, as a result of "rate averaging" there was a cross-
subsidy within the long-distance market; the generous profits
earned on heavily trafficked, densely populated (urban) routes
subsidized less profitable, thin (rural) markets.28
The extent of this revenue-shifting system was substantial.
In 1983, the average monthly price charged for local residen-
tial service was about $11, while the average monthly cost of
providing the service was approximately $26.29 The $15 loss
was subsidized by revenues drawn from long-distance commu-
nications, urban services, business private lines, yellow-page
publication, and equipment leasing. 0 In 1983, the FCC esti-
mated that the revenue transferred within the Bell system to
support local services totalled nearly $7 billion. 1
The approach stimulated the growth of universal service. In
1940, only 50% of U.S. households had telephone service. By
treated as a regulated monopoly. Brenner, Communication Regulation in the Eight-
ies: The Vanishing Drawbridge, 33 ADMIN. L. REV. 255 (1981).
25. Price-elasticity is an economic term used to measure how responsive consum-
ers are to a change in price of a good. As price-elasticity increases, consumers are
increasingly sensitive to a change in price. See generally P. SAMUELSON, W.
NORDHAUS, ECONOMICS (1985).
26. "Value of service" pricing was actually initiated by the telephone companies.
Most state PUCs acquiesced in the concept, particularly after Wisconsin lost in its
effort to establish cost-of-service standards by the size of the exchange, during World
War I. So long as the telephone companies maintained monopoly control, they
tended to overprice industrial sales. This was consistent with value of service pric-
ing, and it was frequently referred to as the vertical market.
27. As an example, average local rates in Colorado in 1910 were $7.10 per month;
by 1985, the rates had risen to only $9.22 per month-a mere 21% increase in 75
years.
28. The Decision to Divest: Incredible or Inevitable?, IEEE SPECTRUM (Nov.
1985), at 46, 48 [hereinafter Decision to Divest].
29. The average monthly cost of providing service included joint and capital
costs. MacAvoy & Robinson, Losing by Judicial Policymaking: The First Year of the
AT&T Divestiture, 2 YALE J. REG. 225 (1985).
30. Actually, the size of this subsidy may be overstated. AT&T's embedded di-
rect-cost studies assigned all the nontraffic sensitive costs to the local exchange and
none to toll services. This resulted in a significant distortion in the allocation of
costs between local and toll services.
31. 48 Fed. Reg. 10321 (Mar. 11, 1983). In order for AT&T to generate this
amount of capital, it had to earn higher than competitive returns on other services,
particularly long-distance telephone.
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1960, this figure had grown to 79%.32 A decade later, it ex-
ceeded 90%, where it has since remained.33
The regulatory structure rested on the premise that mul-
tiple carriers serving an area produced economic waste, cre-
ated additional cost burdens for consumers, and caused
unsatisfactory service quality.34 Local telephone service was
deemed a "natural monopoly," because it was not practical for
different companies to string parallel wires to the same
house.35 Wasteful duplication of service would not only be un-
sightly, but would have ultimately required customers to pay
for fixed costs twice.36  Legislatures and regulatory commis-
sions pointed to several factors that destroyed economies of
scale and ultimately raised costs for all consumers.37 They rec-
ognized that unification and coordination in construction, op-
eration, and maintenance was required for the efficient supply
32. There were approximately 68 million telephones in the United States during
the early 1960s, 82% of which were served by the Bell System. The remaining 18%
were served by approximately 4100 independent telephone companies, and several
thousand more rural or farm lines, virtually all of which were connected to the Bell
System.
33. "[Before divestiture] American telephone service became the best in the
world - and the most universal: 122 million access lines, 1.3 billion calls a day,
phones in 92 percent of American homes .. " D. Miglio, Telecommunications and
Economic Growth 2 (address before the National Governors Association, Portland,
Me., Dec. 17, 1987).
34. W. Lavey, The Public Policies Which Changed the Telephone Industry Into
Regulated Monopolies: Lessons From Around 1915 3-6 (Jan. 1987) (unpublished
manuscript).
35. John Stuart Mill was among the earliest economists to recognize the natural
characteristics of local water and gas distribution companies. See Dempsey, Market
Failure and Regulatory Failure as Catalysts for Political Change: The Choice Be-
tween Imperfect Competition and Imperfect Regulation, 46 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1
(1989).
36. Several other, perhaps less important, justifications for regulation are found
in the Federal Communication Act of 1934. 47 U.S.C. § 151-61 (1983) [hereinafter the
Act.] The Act refers to our national needs for defense and safety of life. Id. The
value of having a telephone nearby during an emergency can hardly be underrated.
But again, both of these justifications are related to the need for universal service.
Section 202 of the Act also prohibits unjust discrimination or preferential rates.
However, this section had little support in the actual practices of the industry at the
time of the drafting the Act, and appears to be a mere carryover of § 2 of the Inter-
state Commerce Act upon which the Federal Communications Act was based. 49
U.S.C. § 2 (1983).
37. Certain economists argue "that for certain services requiring a heavy invest-
ment in infrastructure, there are no social welfare benefits to be had from competi-
tion, because it will result in unnecessary duplication of facilities, prevent the
exploitation of economies of scale, and thus drive up costs for all customers."
Schwartz, Why Changes in Telecommunications Should be Made Slowly and Care-
fully, PUB. UTIL. FORT., Feb. 18, 1988, at 32.
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of telephone services. The concept of natural monopoly, and
its need for economic regulation, had wide support among
economists."8
38. Monopolies have generally been disfavored in American law since promulga-
tion of the Sherman Act of 1890. Antitrust legislation tends to reflect the normative
conclusion that large corporations, reflecting large concentrations of power and
wealth, are undesirable. Hazlett, The Curious Evolution of Natural Monopoly The-
ory, in UNNATURAL MONOPOLIES 3 (R. Poole, Jr. ed. 1985). Professor Richard Lande
has pointed out that the objective of the antitrust laws is to distribute wealth rather
than to promote efficiency. Lande, Wealth Transfers as the Original and Primary
Concern of Antitrust: The Fficiency Interpretation Challenged, 34 HASTINGS L.J. 65
(1982). But a number of industries in our economy are deemed to be natural monop-
olies. Here, the economies of scale are so pervasive that a single firm can offer the
product or service most efficiently and economically. The fixed costs of operation
may be so large that duplicative services are uneconomical. John Stuart Mill was
among the first to recognize the problem, while reviewing the inefficiencies of com-
peting gas and water systems in London:
It is obvious, for example, how great an economy of labor would be obtained
if London were supplied by a single gas or water company instead of the
existing plurality .... Were there only one establishment, it could make
lower charges consistent with obtaining the rate of profit now realized.
J. MILL, PRINCIPLES OF POLITICAL ECONOMY 13 (1926).
By the late 19th century, Richard Ely had identified a number of industries as
natural monopolies, including railroad, express, telegraph, street-car, gas and water
companies. Ely, The Future of Corporations, HARPERS 260, July 1887. Henry Carter
Adams was the first to see natural monopolies in terms of economies of scale. Natu-
ral monopolies:have marginal costs which are both lower than their average costs,
and decline over a long level of output.
The justification for regulating natural monopolies is that once a single firm has
sunk costs in providing sufficient capacity for all users, the marginal costs of service
will be lower if that single firm satisfies all demand. The economies of scale are so
significant that the unit costs of service would increase significantly if more than a
single firm satisfies consumer needs in the region. Hence, less of society's resources
will be consumed if a single firm provides the service. Unrestricted competition
in natural monopoly industries frequently results in "destructive competition"
(whereby firms pricing for a long period of time at marginal costs fail to recover
their fixed cost investment and go bankrupt), wasteful product-service duplication,
and the eventual demise of all but one (or a few) firms.
Because private ownership encourages wealth maximization, a monopolist will
have an incentive to restrict output below, and raise prices above, competitive levels.
Consumers receiving false price signals respond by consuming other, more costly
goods and services. Thus can a laissez faire policy result in a misallocation of re-
sources.
Regulation attempts to force the natural monopolist to produce at a higher level of
output and at a lower price so as to avoid excessive transfers of wealth from consum-
ers to producers. Such wealth transfers from consumers to producers tend to be
regressive in character and therefore undesirable. S. BREYER, REGULATION AND ITS
REFORM 19 (1982).
But these are not the only reasons government constrains the monopolist. As
Professors Breyer and Stewart have noted, "the rationale for regulation of monopoly
power rests not only on economic claims, but also on other objectives such as fairer
income distributions, avoiding discrimination in price or service among customers,
and distrust of the social and political (as well as the economic) power of the unregu-
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Regulatory commissions responded to the efficiency
problems by eliminating competition and the duplication of fa-
cilities. The commissions denied new companies entry if ex-
isting carriers provided adequate service, encouraged carriers
with overlapping service areas to consolidate, and limited the
authority of telephone companies to construct lines where the
area was already adequately served.39
A monopoly, however, has the ability to maximize its profits
by decreasing service and/or increasing prices. This potential
created a need for regulation. The quid pro quo was a guaran-
teed market theoretically free from competition. As one com-
mentator noted, "The Bell System's unique position . . . was
that of a private enterprise with a public trust."4 °
III
Pandora's Box Pried Open: Antitrust and Entry
Assaults on AT&T
A. The First Antitrust Wave and the 1956 Consent Decree
Critics of economic regulation began to question the need to
exclude competition in order to maintain universal service. A
1949 report on the Bell System practices planted the seeds for
the first government antitrust suit against AT&T.4' In that
lawsuit, the U.S. Department of Justice (DOJ) contended that
AT&T and its manufacturing unit, Western Electric, had vio-
lated sections 1, 2, and 3 of the Sherman Act 42 by monopoliz-
ing and conspiring to restrain trade in the manufacture,
distribution, sale and installation of telephones and related
equipment and supplies.43 The DOJ alleged that the absence
of competition defeated effective public regulation and asked
that the Western Electric unit be severed from the Bell
System.
lated monopolist." S. BREYER & R. STEWART, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW AND REGULA-
TORY POLICY 16 (2d ed. 1985).
39. BREYER & STEWART, supra note 38, at 27-33.
40. W. TURNSTALL, DISCONNECTING PARTIES 2 (1985) [hereinafter W.
TURNSTALL].
41. The suit was filed on January 14, 1949. The Walker Report, resulting from
an investigation into AT&T practices, sought authority for the FCC to review and
approve Bell System practices, and to limit the scope of Bell activities in the commu-
nications field. Most of the controversial recommendations were rejected.
Shooshan, supra note 16, at 12-13.
42. 15 U.S.C. §§ 1-3.
43. United States v. Western Electric Co., No. 82-0192 (D.C. Cir. 1949).
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In 1956, the parties concluded a consent decree which pro-
hibited AT&T from engaging in any business other than com-
mon carrier communications.44 Thus, AT&T was forbidden
from entering the nascent computer industry and other areas
of technology, such as computer software, hardware, office
automation equipment, cable television, data processing, and
electronic information publishing.45 Western Electric was pre-
cluded from manufacturing equipment other than that to be
used by the Bell System.4" Bell Labs was required to license
its patents to third parties upon the payment of appropriate
royalties.47
The 1956 Consent Decree had three profound effects: (1)
AT&T was precluded from pursuing the technological break-
throughs of Bell Labs into non-telecommunications fields,
such as computers; (2) the Decree's compulsory licensing re-
quirement meant that competitors could use Bell Labs tech-
nology to assault AT&T's markets; and (3) although AT&T
was precluded from entering into non-telecommunications
ventures, other firms were not prohibited from entering Bell's
telephone markets.48
B. Assault on the Citadel of Regulation: The Tragedy of Small
Decisions
In the 19th century, it was the Bell patents that enabled
AT&T to establish its dominance in telecommunications.
Ironically, in the second half of the 20th century, it was anti-
trust's emasculation of patent rights that gave competitors the
technological means to raid AT&T's most lucrative markets.
44. See id. (consent decree filed Jan. 24, 1956) [hereinafter the 1956 Consent
Decree].
45. Sooshan, supra note 16, at 15.
46. 1956 Consent Decree, supra note 44.
47. Id. at 4.
48. The 1956 Consent Decree had these effects:
First, the decree precluded the Bell System from following its own pioneer-
ing technologies into other lines of business-such as selling solid-state com-
ponents or computers ....
Second, the decree's mandate that the Bell System license all its patents
to all newcomers ensured that other companies, both domestic and foreign,
could use Bell technology outside of regulated telephone markets against
the Bell System.
Third, although the decree effectively forbade the Bell System from en-
tering non-telephone markets, it could not prevent other companies from
entering AT&T's own market of local and long-distance telephone service.
Decision to Divest, supra note 28, at 47.
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By providing the fundamental research and development for
the transistor, microwave, and satellite communications, Bell
Labs inadvertently planted the seeds for the eventual dismem-
berment of the Bell System.
After the 1956 Consent Decree, the communications mar-
ketplace entered a period of tremendous change. Burgeoning
technology and the lure of a large profit margin stimulated
new entry and generated pressure to restructure the Bell Sys-
tem.49 Technological advances, FCC rulings, and judicial deci-
sions served as additional catalysts for additional competition
in the industry.5 °
By the mid-1950s, the Bell System's end-to-end monopoly 51
was under siege. By holding equipment prices and commercial
and long-distance rates at a level significantly above costs, the
regulatory agencies enabled AT&T to enjoy supercompetitive
profits in order to cross-subsidize its losses on local and rural
telephone operations. 2 Entrepreneurs were drawn to AT&T's
overpriced markets like sharks to the smell of blood. Hence,
while Bell Labs' technology provided the means for new com-
petitive entry into the long distance market, distorted econom-
ics provided the incentive.
The assault on the citadel of AT&T's regulated monopoly
began with FCC decisions which impinged first in the phone
equipment sector and later in the long-distance service indus-
try. 3 Congress was of two minds about continuation of the
traditional public utility regulatory approach. Meanwhile, in
the federal courts, the Justice Department and other private
parties were succeeding in antitrust litigation against the mo-
nopoly.54 It was from this front that the fifty-year-old regula-
tory structure of the telecommunications industry was dealt
its devastating blow.
49. See infra text accompanying notes 55-86.
50. See id.
51. AT&T controlled most of the nation's calls from origin to destination, with
most of America's local lines, switches, and long lines under its umbrella. Its mo-
nopoly reached from the sophisticated switches in central offices to the black rotary
dial telephones in most of America's homes.
52. Technological improvements had long since reduced the cost of providing
long-distance service, yet rates were kept high. Local rates, whose costs were in-
creasing, were kept artificially low by the "value of service" rate regulatory mecha-
nism. The result was a cross-subsidy which advanced the public policy of universal
service.
53. See supra notes 41-48.
54. See infra text accompanying notes 117-28.
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1. Hush-A-Phone and Carterphone: Attaching Alien
Devices to Bell Equipment
Because AT&T relied exclusively on equipment manufac-
tured by its subsidiary, Western Electric, it could assure uni-
form quality throughout the Bell System.5 AT&T resisted
the attachment of non-Bell products to the network in order
to protect the system from injury caused by cheap, substan-
dard equipment.5 6 The FCC upheld an AT&T tariff which
prohibited the attachment of foreign telephone devices to the
Bell System network. 7
In November 1956, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Dis-
trict of Columbia Circuit reversed the FCC decision and ruled
that Bell customers had the right to use telephone equipment
manufactured by firms other than Western Electric.5 A small
company, Hush-A-Phone, was allowed to market its cup-like
device which could be attached to a telephone handset to
screen out surrounding noise. 9
In the early 1950s, Carterphone Corporation produced a de-
vice that enabled the customer to place a call from a remote
radio. ° Common carriers complained to the FCC, alleging
that the use of these devices was prohibited under their tariffs.
In the "Carterphone" decision,61 the FCC approved the use of
the device and ordered the common carriers to amend their
tariffs to allow attachment of non-Bell equipment.62 The FCC
55. Decision to Divest, supra note 28.
56. Id. at 48.
57. Hush-A-Phone Corp., 20 F.C.C. 391 (1955).
58. Hush-A-Phone v. United States, 238 F.2d 266 (D.C. Cir. 1956).
59. Sooshan, supra note 16, at 15.
60. The device invented by Thomas Carter interfaced the public telephone sys-
tem with private mobile radio systems. The invention eliminated the wire-to-wire
nature of telephone service and essentially transformed the consumer's telephone
into a two-way radio.
61. Use of the Carterphone Device in Message Toll Telephone Service, 13
F.C.C.2d 430 (1967), recon. denied, 14 F.C.C.2d 571 (1968). See also Hush-A-Phone v.
United States, 238 F.2d 266 (D.C. Cir. 1956) (an early case in which the FCC had
invalidated the tariff prohibiting foreign attachments, but only as related to certain
devices produced by Hush-A-Phone).
62. Wiley, The End of Monopoly, in DISCONNECTING BELL, THE IMPACT OF THE
AT&T DIVESTITURE 23, 27 (H. Shooshan III ed. 1984); Carterphone, 13 F.C.C.2d at
420. Before Carterphone, AT&T had owned virtually every residential telephone
and business switchboard in the country and leased them to customers. However,
the FCC was under political pressure to do something about AT&T's deteriorating
phone service and rising profits. Also, AT&T seemed to be unable to keep up with
new telecommunications technologies. As a result of Carterphone, suddenly phone
users could buy their own equipment and plug it into the telephone lines. S. COLL,
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held that AT&T could not refuse to connect customer-pro-
vided terminal (telephone) equipment to the network.6 Thus,
the Carterphone decision opened the equipment markets that
had previously been the exclusive province of AT&T and the
other common carriers.
2. Above 890 and Execunet: Cream Skimming and By-
Pass Emerge
During the mid-1950s, numerous companies applied for pri-
vate telephone system operating licenses. 64 Many wanted com-
munication lines to areas that the common carriers were
unable to serve with wireline facilities.65 Because such access
required wireless systems, the companies had to apply for
FCC approval to use that part of the radio spectrum above 890
millicycles, more commonly called the microwave field. The
FCC, however, maintained a no-entry policy that permitted
only government agencies and common carriers to hold micro-
wave licenses.
In the 1959 Above 890 decision,66 the FCC overturned its ex-
isting policy and allowed new entrants into the microwave
field. The FCC permitted companies to establish private
phone systems, which relayed interoffice messages via micro-
wave. 7 The decision, however, prohibited the licensed compa-
nies from providing the services for anyone other than their
own employees, and forbade them from sharing microwave fa-
cilities among themselves.
Once these private line carriers had the capacity to engage
in long-distance communications, it was only a matter of time
before they would request authority to begin sharing lines and
services with other customers. In 1969, after providing this
service illegally for several years, Microwave Communications,
Inc. (MCI) won FCC approval to construct and lease micro-
supra note 17, at 11. In ruling that mobile radio systems could be interconnected
with the wireline telephone system, the FCC established the consumer's right to
connect non-carrier technically compatible equipment to the network.
63. S. COLL, supra note 17, at 440-41.
64. Soma, Peterson, Alexander & Petty, The Communications Regulatory Envi-
ronment in the 1980s, 4 COMPUTER L.J. 1 (1983).
65. Note, Intercity Telecommunications Competition after Execunet, 31 FED.
COMM. L.J. 117 (1978).
66. In re Allocation of Frequencies in the Bands Above 890 Mc, 27 F.C.C. 359
(1959) (Report and Order), recon. denied, 29 F.C.C. 825 (1959).
67. Above 890, 27 F.C.C. at 365.
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wave facilities between Chicago, St. Louis, aid nine other cit-
ies.68 The unraveling of the Gordian knot of regulation had
begun in earnest.
MCI and other companies that leased microwave capacity on
a limited basis became known as specialized common carri-
ers.69 MCI employed the new and cheaper microwave technol-
ogy in competition with the long-line services of AT&T was
saddled with the burden of maintaining the nation's basic local
phone network.70 Soon after the MCI approval, a large
number of companies filed specialized common carrier
applications.
In order to protect its markets, AT&T began to oppose the
influx of applications, claiming "cream skimming," i.e., siphon-
ing off the high-profit interoffice and intracompany business.
AT&T claimed this jeopardized the cross-subsidy of local serv-
ices, in turn endangering the longstanding policy of universal
service.
AT&T's opposition forced the FCC to address the general
policy considerations underlying the granting of entry applica-
68. In re Applications of Microwave Communications, Inc., 18 F.C.C.2d 953
(1969), recon. denied, 21 F.C.C.2d 190 (1970). The Commission was by no means
unanimous in its decision. FCC Chairman Rosel Hyde wrote these prophetic words
in dissent:
The decision of the majority is diametrically opposed to sound economics
and regulatory principles. It likewise is designed to cost the'average Ameri-
can ratepayer money to the immediate benefit of a few with special inter-
ests....
[H]ow is it that applicant is able to propose lower rates than the existing
common carriers for private line service? For no reason other than that it is
proposing a typical "cream skimming" operation. Thus, it has selected a
major route, Chicago to St. Louis, with heavy traffic density characteristics
and the concomitant lower unit costs. The existing common carriers, on the
other hand have been encouraged by the Commission, primarily for social
reasons, to base their rates both for message toll and private line services on
nationwide average costs. Thus the small users in the hinterlands are af-
forded the same rates as the large users in major cities .... AT&T and
Western Union could offer lower rates for private line service between Chi-
cago and St. Louis than those proposed by MCI, were they to base such
rates on their costs for that route alone.
... AT&T and Western Union will be constrained to lower their private
line rates to meet the competition of MCI. This, however, means that other
users .. .will have to make up the difference if total revenue requirements
are to be met ....
The effect of the majority decision is to destroy the principles of nation-
wide average ratemaking.
Id. at 971.
69. The FCC designated these firms "Specialized Common Carriers."
70. S. COLL, supra note 17, at 11-12.
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tions into the microwave field. In 1971, the FCC adopted a
general policy in favor of granting private-line microwave ap-
plications. 1 The FCC casually dismissed AT&T's cream skim-
ming argument stating,
We do not see how there could be any diversion of revenues
of a magnitude to have the impact claimed by AT&T, in view
of the very small percentage of AT&T's existing total market
that is vulnerable to competition of the kind proposed here,
the growth rate of Bell's basic services, and the likelihood
that AT&T would obtain a very substantial share of the po-
tential market for specialized service.72
The local telephone companies were directed to make their lo-
cal facilities available to the new carriers on a non-discrimina-
tory basis.73 This decision was yet another indication that a
new attitude was emerging at the FCC, one which favored
competition in long-distance message telephone service (MTS).
In 1974, MCI filed a revision of its tariffs to include "Ex-
ecunet," a service offered to individual customers in which a
subscriber could use MCI's long-distance capacity between
towns served by MCI by simply dialing an access code on a
push-button telephone. AT&T immediately filed complaints
with the FCC. In 1975, the FCC rejected MCI's tariffs, and
ordered it to cease and desist from offering consumer service
on the grounds that MCI lacked authority to provide con-
sumer services.74
In a decision now known as Execunet I,7 the District of
Columbia Circuit Court of Appeals held that the FCC was
without authority to forbid MCI's new service because the
Communications Act of 1934 did not grant the FCC the power
to restrict services offered over existing communications facili-
ties.76 Finding that the FCC had never held that AT&T's mo-
71. In re Establishment of Policies and Procedures for consideration of Applica-
tions to Provide Specialized Common Carrier services in the Domestic Public Point-
to-Point Microwave Radio Service and Proposed Amendments to Parts 21, 43, and 61
of the Commission's Rules, First Report and Order, 29 F.C.C.2d 870 (1971), aff'd sub
nom. Washington Util. & Transp. Comm'n v. FCC, 513 F.2d 1142 (9th Cir. 1975), cert
denied sub nom. 423 U.S. 836 (1975).
72. First Report and Order, 29 F.C.C.2d at 910.
73. Wiley, supra note 62, at 33-34; Specialized Common Carrier Services, 29
F.C.C.2d 870 (1971), aff'd sub nom. Washington Util. and Transp. Comm'n v. FCC,
513 F.2d 1142 (9th Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 836 (1975).
74. MCI Telecommunications Corp., 60 F.C.C.2d 25 (1976).
75. MCI Telecommunications Corp. v. FCC, 561 F.2d 365 (D.C. Cir. 1977), cert.
denied sub nom. 434 U.S. 1040 (1978) (commonly known as Execunet I).
76. Execunet 1, 561 F.2d at 369.
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nopoly on long-distance service to be in the public interest, the
court ruled that the FCC must allow the specialized carriers to
offer ordinary long-distance telephone service to the public in
competition with AT&T.77
AT&T immediately requested that the FCC issue an order
to the effect that AT&T would be under no obligation to inter-
connect, that is, to connect a phone call made or received on
its lines with MCI's long-distance facilities. The FCC agreed
and issued the order in 1976.78 Upon a complaint filed by
MCI, however, the D.C. Circuit Court of Appeals ordered the
FCC to dismiss its order and mandated that AT&T provide in-
terconnection services for all specialized interstate communi-
cation.79 This decision, Execunet II, left no doubt that
specialized common carriers would be permitted to expand
services even if they competed with established common car-
rier long-distance or local service.80 In Execunet III, the obli-
gation to interconnect was extended to all independent local
exchange companies.8 '
In 1980, the FCC handed down its Second Computer Inquiry
decision (Computer Ii),82 which divided all services into "ba-
sic" (those traditionally handled by common carriers) and "en-
hanced" (such as those involving data processing) categories.8 3
Computer II also deregulated "enhanced" services and con-
sumer premises equipment.8 4 AT&T was allowed to sell en-
hanced services and equipment, but only through a separate
subsidiary.85 Thus, by the early 1980's, it appeared that every
major portion of the Bell System (except unprofitable local
exchange services) had been opened to competitive entry.
The FCC and court decisions in Carterphone, Above 890,
Specialized Common Carrier, Computer II, and Execunet I, II,
and III, each brought increased competition to the telecommu-
nications industry. Individually, they were inconsequential in
77. Wiley, supra note 62, at 36-37; Execunet I, 561 F.2d at 380.
78. Petition of AT&T for a Declaratory Ruling and Expedited Relief, 67 F.C.C.2d
1455 (1978).
79. MCI Telecommunications Corp. v. FCC, 580 F.2d 590 (D.C. Cir. 1978), cert.
denied, 439 U.S. 980 (1978) (commonly known as Execunet II).
80. See Note, supra note 65.
81. Lincoln T&T v. FCC, 659 F.2d 1092 (D.C. Cir. 1981) (commonly known as
Execunet III).
82. Second Computer Inquiry, 77 F.C.C.2d 384 (final decision 1980).
83. Id. at 417-23.
84. Id. at 423-28.
85. Decision to Divest, supra note 28, at 48.
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their impact on the cross-subsidies mandated by universal ser-
vice. Collectively, this band of Lilliputian warriors brought
down the Bell giant by making the abandonment of traditional
regulatory notions of cross-subsidization and universal service
inevitable. The process reached its apex in 1982 when the Bell
System, after years of expensive and protracted litigation with
the Justice Department, agreed to divest certain regulated
portions of its system from its increasingly competitive long-
distance communications services.86
C. The War on Other Fronts: Charging up Capitol Hill
In the 1970s, AT&T's concerns about the "fence with a one-
way hole in it" (whereby other companies could enter AT&T's
markets, but AT&T was prohibited from entering theirs), led
the company to press Congress for legislation updating the
Communications Act of 1934.87 AT&T wanted Congress to af-
firm the "universal service" principle, approve Bell's existence
as a natural monopoly, and statutorily mandate its regulation
as a public utility.88
In 1976, AT&T and the independent telephone companies
began to urge congressional attention to telecommunica-
tions.8 9 In response, nearly 200 members of Congress joined to
co-sponsor the Consumer Communications Reform Act
(CCRA). 90 The CCRA would have reaffirmed the universal
service doctrine by providing that "the integrated interstate
telecommunications network shall be structured so as to as-
sure widely available, high quality telecommunications serv-
ices to all the Nation's telecommunications users." 91 It would
also have transferred the FCC's jurisdiction over station and
86. United States v. AT&T, 552 F. Supp. 131 (D.D.C. 1982), aff'd sub nom. Mary-
land v. United States, 460 U.S. 1001 (1983).
87. Federal Communications Act of 1934, 47 U.S.C. § 151 (1983).
88. W. TURNSTALL, supra note 40, at 189. If professional sports could be ac-
corded an antitrust shield, could not an industry so vital to the nation as communica-
tions be given immunity?
89. Actually, the General Accounting Office had already issued a study which
recommended a number of changes iri the regulation of communications common
carriers. It called upon Congress to clarify the policy objectives of common carrier
regulation and to deregulate markets where competition appears feasible and benefi-
cial to the public. Hearings on H.R. 6121 Before the Subcomm. on Monopolies and
Commercial Law of the House Comm. on the Judiciary, 96th Cong., 2d Sess. (1980)
[hereinafter Monopoly Subcommittee Hearings].
90. W. TURNSTALL, supra note 40, at 189. The bill, derisively referred to as the
"Bell Bill," was also supported by the Communications Workers of America.
91. Id. at 10.
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terminal equipment to the states; given the states the power to
establish intercommunications rules, define station equipment,
and dictate the terms for equipment marketing; and permitted
the states to control the interconnection of interstate special-
ized carriers to the local distribution networks.92 The CCRA,
however, was not passed. Instead, it became the opening salvo
in a six-year congressional battle over telecommunications
policy.9
By the late 1970s, the political mood in Washington had
shifted significantly. Swept up in the euphoria of laissez faire
economics, Congress deregulated the airlines in 1977 and
1978, 94 and the railroads and motor carriers in 1980.15 Reading
the early empirical results with approval, many congressmen
were in no mood to expand regulation. Indeed, some were
eager to enter a brave new world of telecommunications
deregulation.
In 1978, the House considered a bill which would have
amended significant portions of the Communications Act of
1934.96 The amendment addressed not only telecommunica-
tions, but broadcasting and cable as well. Most importantly, it
would have divested AT&T of Western Electric.97 The follow-
ing year, Representative Van Deerlin tried again, introducing
the Communications Act of 1979, which would have relied on
competition "to the maximum extent possible to determine
the variety, quality and cost of telecommunications services
and facilities."9 " The Van Deerlin bill, which also died in com-
mittee, was a comprehensive revision of the CCRA from a
more pro-competitive standpoint.99
92. J. SOMA, COMPUTER TECHNOLOGY AND THE LAW 185-86 (1983) [hereinafter J.
SOMA].
93. W. TURNSTALL, supra note 40, at 10.
94. See Dempsey, The Rise and Fall of the Civil Aeronautics Board-Opening
Wide the Floodgates of Entry, 11 TRANSP. L.J. 91 (1979); P. DEMPSEY, LAW & FOR-
EIGN POLICY IN INTERNATIONAL AVIATION (1987).
95. See Dempsey, Congressional Intent and Agency Discretion-Never the Twain
Shall Meet: The Motor Carrier Act of 1980, 58 CHI. KENT L. REV. 1 (1982); Dempsey,
The Interstate Commerce Commission: Disintegration of an American Legal Institu-
tion, 34 AM. U.L. REV. 1 (1984); P. DEMPSEY & W. THOMS, LAW & ECONOMIC REGU-
LATION IN TRANSPORTATION (1986).
96. H.R. 13015, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. (1978).
97. Monopoly Subcommittee Hearings, supra note 89, at 156. After several
months of hearings, the 95th Congress adjourned before action could be taken.
98. H.R. 3333, 96th Cong., 1st Sess. (1979). The bill would not have required di-
vestiture of Western Electric.
99. W. TURNSTALL, supra note 40, at 11. Although the Van Deerling bill would
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Moreover, all was not quiet on the Senate front. During
1979, several bills were introduced. Senator Ernest Hollings
(D.-S.C.) introduced the Communications Act Amendments of
1979,100 which would have directed the FCC to promote effi-
cient telecommunications services at reasonable rates. Senator
Barry Goldwater (R.-Ariz.) sponsored the Communications
Competition and Deregulation Act of 1979, which would have
deregulated the industry over a six-year period and required
monopoly telephone companies to set up separate subsidiaries
in competitive markets. 101
In 1980, the House Communications Subcommittee approved
Representative Tim Wirth's (D.-Colo.) proposed Telecommu-
nications Act of 1980,1"2 which would have established a
number of prerequisites for entrance into competitive
markets. 103
not have required the divestiture of Western Electric, it received scant support be-
cause there was a feeling among most members of the subcommittee that inclusion
of broadcasting and cable would delay its enactment. Monopoly Subcommittee Hear-
ings, supra note 89.
100. S. 611, 96th Cong., 1st Sess. (1979).
101. Telecommunications Through the Years, supra note 14, at 262.
102. H.R. 6121, 96th Cong., 2d Sess. (1980).
103. The bill required firms to set up arms-length subsidiaries and to refrain from
using regulated revenue to cross-subsidize competitive ventures.
Although the bill retained the principle of universal service, it forbade the cross-
subsidization of funds from regulated monopoly operations to unregulated competi-
tive ventures. Regulatory authority would have been retained on "basic telecommu-
nications services," and on those functions necessary to "establish standards and take
other appropriate action, to promote the national defense and security and the emer-
gency preparedness of the Nation." Id. at § 212(a)(3). The most important thrust of
the proposed legislation was the requirement that a "dominant carrier" (a/k/a
AT&T) had to establish "fully separated subsidiaries" in order to enter any deregu-
lated, competitive market. Id. at § 202(4).
This separate subsidy provision did not entirely please the Justice Department,
which was embroiled in antitrust litigation with AT&T. The DOJ's principal con-
cern was that the bill would allow AT&T to enter markets other than basic telecom-
munications, in violation of the 1956 Consent Decree. The DOJ argued that if
Congress was going to legislatively overturn the 1956 Consent Decree, it should do so
only after complete divestiture and restructuring of AT&T, so as to ameliorate the
potential for monopoly abuse. Monopoly Subcommittee Hearings, supra note 89, at
511.
Charles D. Ferris, then Chairman of the FCC, also questioned the bill's efficacy
and its ultimate detriment to the consumer. In his statement before the House Sub-
committee on Monopolies and Commercial Law, Chairman Ferris said "[r]equiring
dominant carriers to reorganize their activities into separate subsidiaries changes
none of the carriers' basic incentives .... In a nutshell, I do not believe these rela-
tionships can be legislatively prescribed for all time in a single definitive legislative
act without creating significant risks of anticompetitive practices or burdens on rate-
payers." Id. at 517-18. Mr. Ferris' solution was to leave the regulatory structure
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In 1981, the Senate, by a vote of ninety to four, passed Sena-
tor Robert Packwood's (R.-Ore.) Telecommunications Compe-
tition and Deregulation Act of 1981.14 Senator Packwood's
bill was largelyan effort to deregulate the industry,10 limiting
regulation to those markets where no competitive alternative
existed." 6 In the House, Representative Tim Wirth returned
with the Telecommunications Act of 1981,1"7 described by one
commentator as "[m]ore drastic still in its zeal to restructure
the industry." ' Congressman Wirth's bill would have re-
quired the FCC to deregulate competitive markets, and pro-
mote competition in those markets lacking it.10 9 AT&T
strongly opposed the Wirth bill on grounds that it would dis-
rupt the nation's telecommunications system by placing oner-
ous burdens on long-distance carriers. 110
alone and allow the FCC to continue to regulate it. Id. This position was echoed by
Walter Hinchman, past FCC Common Carrier Bureau Chief, who said, "I believe
one cannot simply assume that instant, substantial deregulation of such [a monopo-
listic] industry structure will automatically lead to effective competition and associ-
ated public benefits." Id. at 568. The bill was not passed.
104. S. 898, 97th Cong., 1st Sess. (1981).
105. In hearings before the Senate Commerce Committee, which Senator
Packwood chaired, he said, "[W]e're used to this deregulation business. We went
through truck deregulation against the objections of the American Trucking Associ-
ation and the Teamsters, and airline deregulation, over the objections of the Air
Transport Association, with the exception of United Airlines .... And if [the com-
munications industry] cannot come up with better lobbying arguments than they've
come up with so far, which is that they cannot compete, then I feel sorry for the
shape of their industries." SENATE COMM. ON COMMERCE, SCIENCE, AND TRANSPOR-
TATION, TELECOMMUNICATIONS COMPETITION AND DEREGULATION ACT OF 1981, S.
REP. No. 170, 97th Cong., 1st Sess. (1981) [hereinafter COMMERCE COMMITTEE RE-
PORT]. Alfred Kahn, the godfather of deregulation, proclaimed, "It is now clear to
all--or almost all-that competition will better protect the public and, especially,
encourage the fullest exploitation of the enormous potential of this rapidly develop-
ing technology." Id. at 155.
In contrast, several state officials expressed serious concern about the possibility
of local rate increases because of the loss of the long-distance cross-subsidy. Said
one, "After all, long distance calls cannot be completed without the use of local facil-
ities and, therefore, economies occurring in long distance should be shared with local
users." Id. at 192 (statement of Edward Hipp). Concerns were also expressed over
the future of Bell Labs. Id. at 251 (statement of Ian Ross).
106. J. SOMA, supra note 92, at 187. The bill had five principal objectives: (1) to
deregulate consumer premises equipment; (2) to deregulate information services; (3)
to deregulate some telecommunications services; (4) to establish a system of access
charges; and (5) to extend federal jurisdiction over intrastate toll rates.
107. H.R. 5158, 97th Cong., 1st Sess. (1981). See Telecommunications Through the
Years, supra note 14, at 263-64.
108. W. TURNSTALL, supra note 40, at 11.
109. J. SOMA, supra note 92, at 189.
110. Id. at 203.
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Hence, legislation that AT&T had hoped would restore na-
tional communications policy was repeatedly stalled on the
Hill.1 ' Some congressmen assured AT&T that they would re-
store the status quo if the courts ordered divestiture, while
others, such as deregulation proponents Packwood and Wirth,
proposed to inject even more competition into the market.
Senator Hollings prophetically observed that when "service
starts deteriorating and breaking down, . . . our constituents
[will] tell us: 'Those dumb politicians up there, we had a pretty
good communications service and they have gone and messed
it up, too.' "112
By 1982, AT&T believed that it was unlikely to get help
from Congress against the Justice Department's criminal pros-
ecution and that Congress might well make things worse. No
doubt, the chaotic nature of this political environment
weighed heavily in AT&T's decision to negotiate a settlement
with the Justice Department." 3
D. The Second Antitrust Barrage: The Breakup of AT&T
On November 20, 1974, a second antitrust action was
brought against AT&T by the Justice Department under sec-
tion 2 of the Sherman Act." 4 The DOJ claimed that AT&T
had illegally monopolized markets in equipment, local ex-
change, and long-distance, throughout the domestic telecom-
munications industry."5 AT&T allegedly refused to provide
competitors with local interconnection service, and set prices
to inhibit potential competition. The Justice Department orig-
inally sought the divestiture of the Bell Operating Companies
111. Decision to Divest, supra note 28, at 51.
112. COMMERCE COMMITTEE REPORT, supra note 105, at 34.
113. United States v. AT&T, 552 F. Supp. 131 (D.D.C. 1982), aff'd sub nom. Mary-
land v. United States, 460 U.S. 1001 (1983)(originally filed as No. 74-1698 (D.D.C.
filed Nov. 20, 1974)).
114. Id.
115. MacAvoy & Robinson, Winning by Losing: The AT&T Settlement and its
Impact on Telecommunications, 1 YALE J. ON REG. 1, 14 (1983). At the trial, wit-
nesses were to testify regarding their attempts to sell telephone equipment in com-
petition with Western Electric, and that most of AT&T's own purchasing, on behalf
of its customers, was done internally to the exclusion of competitors. S. COLL, supra
note 17, at 192. The Chairman of MCI, William McGowan, has been credited to be
the one person, more than any other, responsible for the existence of United States
v. AT&T S. COLL, supra note 17, at 200. McGowan was convinced that AT&T was
violating the antitrust laws through the existence of a "bottleneck monopoly," where
one company owns essential facilities, such as local telephone exchanges, that are
required in the competitor's business. Id. at 55.
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(BOCs) from AT&T, the dissolution of Western Electric, and a
requirement that Western Electric surrender its 50% owner-
ship of Bell Labs. AT&T Chairman Brown is reputed to have
remarked, "If AT&T lost Western Electric and Bell Labs, it
would have lost its technological capability and become [a util-
ity] more or less like a water company." '116
Despite opposition from the Departments of Commerce and
Defense, Assistant Attorney General William Baxter vowed to
"litigate the suit to the eyeballs.""' 7 One commentator suc-
cinctly summed up the paradox of antitrust litigation against a
regulated industry:
The basis of antitrust theory is the assumption that monopoly
is intolerable; regulatory theory calls for a common carrier to
operate as a monopoly, with public oversight .... AT&T ar-
gued that the Department of Justice suit placed the company
in an impossible double bind. It objected to being punished by
antitrust litigation for complying faithfully with its regula-
tory charter."8
Moreover, on the heels of the Justice Department's criminal
action, a number of civil antitrust suits were brought by com-
munications companies against AT&T. In 1980, MCI won $1.8
billion in treble damages (later reduced) on its complaint al-
leging fifteen violations." 9 The following year, Litton Systems
was awarded a $276.8 million jury verdict. 20 Private antitrust
litigation against the Bell System was prolific, with more than
fifty suits filed in the preceding two decades.' 2 '
116. Decision to Divest, supra note 28, at 51.
117. Id. at 50. Baxter, previously and subsequently a Stanford Law Professor, had
a philosophy consistent with the Chicago School, i.e., one hostile to government reg-
ulation. He wanted long-distance freed of entry barriers and open to deregulation,
leaving local exchange service, which he perceived to be a natural monopoly, regu-
lated. Id. at 49.
118. W. TURNSTALL, supra note 40, at 12 [emphasis in original]. Ian Ross, Presi-
dent of Bell Labs, said that the litigation had nothing to do with antitrust at all. "It
was framed in the context of antitrust, but it was certainly not the type of situation
with which the Sherman Act or Clayton Act were originally enacted to deal. The
issue was really focused on industry structure, not a particular company's conduct.
Now, to get the [desired] structure they had to allege conduct, and it was made to
sound like antitrust." Decision to Divest, supra note 28, at 54-55.
119. MCI Communications Corp. v. AT&T, 462 F. Supp. 1072 (N.D. Ill. 1978),
affl'd, 594 F.2d 594 (7th Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 440 U.S. 971 (1980). See Waller, The
"New" Law of Monopolization: An Examination of MCI Communications Corp. v.
AT&T, 32 DE PAUL L. REV. 595 (1983).
120. Litton Systems Inc. v. AT&T, 700 F.2d 785 (2d Cir. 1983), cert. denied, 464
U.S. 1073 (1984). See Telecommunications Through the Years, supra note 14, at 264.
121. See, e.g., Mid-Texas Communications Sys., Inc. v. AT&T, 615 F.2d 1372 (5th
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A number of factors induced AT&T to throw in the towel
and negotiate the best deal possible for its shareholders: 1)
AT&T had already spent $375 million litigating the criminal
suit; 2) Judge Harold H. Greene of the Federal District Court
for the District of Columbia appeared to be hostile to AT&T's
position;1 22 3) the prospect of congressional relief was doubt-
ful; 4) AT&T had already lost several civil antitrust suits; and
5) as a consequence, AT&T was experiencing tremendous un-
certainty with business planning.123 In 1982, Judge Greene ap-
proved a settlement agreement between the DOJ and AT&T
in an opinion entitled Modified Final Judgment (MFJ).124 It
ended the Department of Justice's eight-year antitrust prose-
cution of AT&T and terminated the 1956 Consent Decree. On
January 1, 1984, AT&T was reorganized and divested of its
Bell Operating Companies. 125
The breakup of AT&T is among the most significant anti-
trust decisions in American legal history. It is certainly the
most significant single event in American telecommunications
history. Before the breakup, AT&T was the largest corpora-
tion in the United States, both in terms of assets and employ-
ment. In 1977, it had assets of $94 billion126 -nearly 4% of the
assets of all nonfinancial corporations in the United States. It
employed 1.1 million people, a work force exceeding the popu-
lation of 13 states.127 By 1983, the last full year before divesti-
ture, the Bell System had assets of $150 billion, revenues of
$70 billion (approximately 2% of the gross national product),
Cir. 1980); Woodland Telecommunications Corp. v. Southwestern Bell Tel. Co., 449
U.S. 912 (1980); Northeastern Tel. Co. v. AT&T, 651 F.2d 76 (2d Cir. 1981), cert. de-
nied, 455 U.S. 943 (1982).
122. As Assistant Attorney General Baxter observed, "My guess is that AT&T
feels that Greene would have done something both vindictive and stupid. He was
very hostile to the company, as his written opinions revealed. Old-fashioned popu-
lism might account for some of this, but much of the hostility seemed to develop in
the course of the trial." Decision to Divest, supra note 28, at 54.
123. In retrospect, the deal seemed not to be the best for AT&T, even though it
was allowed to retain Bell Labs and Western Electric. AT&T's profitability has gen-
erally been below that of all U.S. manufacturers since divestiture, while the Bell
Regional Holding Companies have generally out-performed the rest of the economy.
124. United States v. AT&T, 552 F. Supp. 131 (D.D.C. 1982), aff'd sub nom. Mary-
land v. United States, 460 U.S. 1001 (1983).
125. George Orwell warned us that the year 1984 would be a dark one.
126. See AMERICAN TELEPHONE & TELEGRAPH COMPANY, 1977 ANNUAL REPORT
(1978).
127. F. SCHERER, INDUSTRIAL MARKET STRUCTURE AND ECONOMIC PERFORMANCE
45 (2d ed. 1980).
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and was the largest employer in the nation.128
The MFJ enabled AT&T to shed itself of its money-losing
local operations, the twenty-two BOCs, and to retain its lucra-
tive interchange long-distance service. 129 At the same time,
AT&T was freed to compete against "cream skimming" entre-
preneurs in the long-distance markets. AT&T was permitted
to keep Bell Labs and Western Electric, and thereby retain its
technological and research dominance. AT&T was also free to
engage in computer services, which had been forbidden by the
1956 Consent Decree.
At the time, the conventional wisdom was that AT&T was
making off with the "crown jewels" of the long-distance, re-
search, equipment and international divisions of the Bell Sys-
tem, leaving the seven Baby Bells (i.e., the Regional Holding
Companies, RHCs, commonly known as RBOCs)3 ° saddled
with local exchange service. ' l Under the MFJ, the RBOCs
were prohibited from providing interexchange or information
services, and from manufacturing equipment.3 2 They were to
continue providing local exchange service and were allowed to
sell consumer-premises equipment. It appeared that the only
prize of any consequence thrown to the Baby Bells was that of
the lucrative Yellow Pages. 3
128. Decision to Divest, supra note 28, at 48. "By most assessments, reorganizing
the surviving parent company was the most radical of the transformations. It en-
tailed the separation of $112 billion (of $155 billion) in assets; identifying and absorb-
ing 136,000 employees from other Bell units; redesigning and reprogramming scores
of complex administrative systems; preparing millions of pages of documentation in
support of 467 new tariff filings; undertaking stock transfer details for some 3 mil-
lion shareholders; writing and negotiating nineteen major contracts between AT&T
and the divested companies; taking title to 26,000 motor vehicles and 650 buildings;
and most difficult of all, dividing the nationwide network eight ways. F. SCHERER,
supra note 127, at 96.
129. The characterization of local operations as "money losing" and long-distance
as "lucrative" may actually have been erroneous, based on an inaccurate distribution
of system costs, and an insufficient appreciation of the monopoly attributes of the
local bottleneck.
130. The seven regional holding companies are Ameritech, Bell Atlantic, Bell
South, NYNEX, Pacific Telesis Group, Southwestern Bell, and US West.
131. Spievack, The Truth About Telephone Company Diversification, PUB. UTIL.
FORT., May 15, 1986, at 13-14. In fact, the conventional wisdom was wrong. The
RBOCs have out-performed AT&T since divestiture, for the local exchange has
turned out to be a cash cow, and competition has wiped out the traditional creamy
profits of long-distance. Id.
132. United States v. AT&T, 552 F. Supp. 131, 227-28 (D.D.C. 1982).
133. Judge Greene recognized that "Yellow Pages provide a significant subsidy to
local telephone rates." He envisioned that they would continue to cross-subsidize
local losses if they were left with the BOCs. Id. at 152. Nevertheless, at least one
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One product of divestiture was the local access transporta-
tion area (LATA). The nation was divided into 161 LATAs,
with many states having more than one. RBOCs were allowed
to provide intraLATA, but not interLATA service. The latter
was reserved to the long-distance companies, AT&T and its ri-
vals. Judge Greene also established line of business restric-
tions for the RBOCs, prohibiting them from manufacturing
telecommunications equipment, providing information serv-
ices, or any other non-telecommunications goods or services
without his approval.3 Thus, Judge Greene retained jurisdic-
tion over the industry, becoming a de facto national communi-
cations "czar."
The MFJ was not favorably received by the public. Accord-
ing to a 1984 survey, 64% of the adults responding thought
that the AT&T breakup was a bad idea.135 They believed that
if anyone was to benefit from divestiture it would be business
users, not residential consumers; they believed that residential
users would henceforth pay more for poorer service.136
E. The Absence of a Coherent Regulatory and Antitrust Policy
in Telecommunications
Traditionally, the telecommunications ratemaking structure
divorced rates from costs. As noted above, long-distance rates
were set at a level substantially above costs in order to subsi-
dize local service. Commercial rates were set higher than resi-
dential rates; urban and rural users paid similar rates though
the costs to serve them differed significantly. In the 1960s and
RBOC, US West, has taken Yellow Pages out of its BOCs and consolidated their
operations. Although some states have protested on grounds that Yellow Pages prof-
its were designed to help ameliorate local residential losses, US West has refused to
return the assets to the BOCs or to attribute revenue to local operations until it was
forced to do so by litigation. For its part, US West makes a strong, and perhaps
convincing, case that Yellow Page consolidation enhances the efficiency of its pro-
duction, and that telephone advertising is now a fully competitive industry and
ought, therefore, to be defaulted.
134. See Megdal, An Assessment of Telecommunications Regulation, N.M. Bus. F.
(Mar. 1988). Judge Greene subsequently removed restrictions on BOC transmission
of information, and entry into non-telecommunications lines of business. Id.
135. Jackson, Business Week/Harris Poll: The Public Sees the Little Guy As the
Loser, Bus. WK., Dec. 3, 1984, at 89.
136. "The public's perception is not far wrong. As a result of the phasing out of
subsidies from long-distance calls, the cost of local service has been rising sharply."
Id.
[Vol. 11:527
1989] TELECOMMUNICATIONS DEREGULATION POLICY 555
1970s, long-distance revenues covered a greater portion of
137costs of both local and long-distance operations.
Technological innovations created scale economies in sup-
plying high density, long-distance routes. Yet because of the
regulatory mandate of "universal service," long-distance prices
were set at a level well above marginal costs.3'3  The price
structure which resulted inevitably attracted new entrants to
the long distance market.3 9
Meanwhile, public criticism of monopolies, big business, and
AT&T increased. 140 In a political revolt against inflation, high
taxes, and big government, "deregulation" became the ideolog-
ical centerpiece of both the Carter and the Reagan Adminis-
trations. Swept up in the prevailing philosophy that laissez
faire is superior to government regulation, it was predicted
that deregulation would spawn competition, which would re-
duce prices, provide technological innovation and increase con-
sumer satisfaction.'
41
This is not to suggest that divestiture was accomplished with
a careful and deliberate assessment or redefinition of national
communications policy. It is not clear whether the FCC or the
D.C. Circuit Court of Appeals fully appreciated the impact
MCI's "cream skimming" would have on the legislative policy
of universal service. Nor did either necessarily realize the in-
tricacies of cross-subsidization. 42
137. MacAvoy & Robinson, supra note 29, at 228; Greene, AT&T Divestiture and
Consumers, 5 U. BRIDGEPORT L. REV. 251, 256 (1985).
138. J. WENDERS, THE ECONOMICS OF TELECOMMUNICATIONS, 159-65 (1987). A
year after the Carterphone decision, the FCC, convinced that MCI could operate
more efficiently by using microwaves and that its prices would be lower than
AT&T's since AT&T was paying for the upkeep of the nation's basic local telephone
network, granted MCI's application to enter the intercity "private line" business be-
tween Chicago and St. Louis. S. COLL, supra note 17, at 11, 12. In a regulatory envi-
ronment, raising rates for anyone is politically difficult, particularly for a
numerically larger group, like local residential users. Political and social considera-
tions took priority over economic theory.
139. M. CREW & P. KLEINDORFER, THE ECONOMICS OF PUBLIC UTILITY REGULA-
TION 211 (1986). See also J. WENDERS, supra note 138, at 106.
140. S. COLL, supra note 17, at 31.
141. The Justice Department's reasoning in filing the antitrust action was to in-
crease competition in long-distance and telephone equipment markets in order to
facilitate lower prices, higher quality, and greater variety. Greene, supra note 137, at
252.
142. See supra text accompanying notes 25-33. Divestiture threatened the tradi-
tional cross-subsidies under which long-distance rates cross-subsidied local service,
urban rates supported rural service, and commercial rates cross-subsidized residen-
tial service.
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Congress itself ,seemed to be of two minds. As shown, Con-
gressmen Packwood and Wirth were calling for deregulation,
while others were promising corrective legislation if the fed-
eral courts ordered divestiture. 4 ' Nonetheless, congressional
.inertia, public apathy, and an impotent FCC made it possible
for a tenacious Reagan Administration Justice Department to
proceed aggressively with its antitrust assault on AT&T.
AT&T, the victim of a chaotic hybrid public policy of competi-
tion and traditional monopoly service obligations, found itself
threatened by an antitrust Sword of Damocles-forced to cut
the best deal possible, one which would preserve its research
and manufacturing arms, while chopping off its local service
legs.14 4
In retrospect, it appears that national regulatory policy has
rarely been implemented a less coherent move. As Steve Coll
noted in his incisive book on the subject, there was never any
"clear coherent vision [at the DOJ or the FCC] about how a
decentralized telecommunications system would work better
than an existing one.' 1 45 Congress and the FCC should have
taken the lead on such a profound question of public policy,
instead of standing idly by while the DOJ and a maverick fed-
eral judge seized the moment. 46
143. See supra text accompanying notes 87-113.
144. W. TURNSTALL, supra note 40, at 16.
145. S. COLL, supra note 17, at 369. He continued:
Precious little in [the] history [of AT&T's divestiture] ... was the product of
a single coherent philosophy, or a genuine, reasoned consensus, or a far-
sighted public policy strategy. Rather the crucial decisions made in the tele-
communications industry during the 1970s and early 1980s were driven by
opportunism, short-term politics, ego, desperation, miscalculation, happen-
stance, greed, conflicting theologies and personalities, and finally, when
[AT&T] thought that there was nothing left, a perceived necessity.
Id. See generally R. KRAUS & A. DUERIG, THE RAPE OF MA BELL (1988).
146. After noting that government deregulation has left the individual consumer
to the regulatory whims of the firms which provide service, Professor Victor Rosen-
blum addressed the process by which we achieved this result:
[B]efore we accept the blandishments of the notion that deregulation really
means that we are deregulated, we ought to have empirical data about the
consequences of so-called deregulation for the ordinary human being and
not simply for a few favored entrepreneurs who are the beneficiaries of the
term.... [T]here are serious questions about whether leaving things to the
antitrusters will invariably put us in a better position than having us subject
to regulation by administrative agencies.
My recent experiences, and perhaps some of yours, with regard to tele-
phone systems are not all that encouraging in that regard. When I pick up
my telephone today, I find that I have poorer service at generally higher
cost than was the case when Ma Bell was subject fully to the Federal Coin-
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If the regulators were to insist that long-distance prices be
held above marginal costs in order to provide revenues that
would sustain cross-subsidization of local service, it was inevi-
table that when the technological means became available new
entrants would be attracted to those markets in which
supracompetitive profits were being realized. Had AT&T been
allowed to reduce its prices for long-distance service as techno-
logical improvements reduced cost, MCI might never have
been born.147 Alternatively, if there was an important public
interest in maintaining the cross-subsidy, both entry and anti-
trust shields should have been erected. The absence of a uni-
fied, coherent policy led to a series of economic and social
consequences which have been far from optimal.
IV
The Regulatory Response to Divestiture
Numerous regulatory problems were created by the par-
tially competitive environment engendered by divestiture.
Predictably, the Reagan Administration's FCC advocated de-
regulation. Judge Harold Greene's approach has been a cau-
tious liberalization of the line of business restrictions on the
RBOCs. The state PUCs have been faced with the difficult
question of how much deregulation to allow in intrastate local
and toll services. 48
munications Commission's regulations. The breakup, which was a breakup
that was ordered through the application of antitrust law, may or may not
in the long run turn out to have been a wise action.
But it seems to me that it was at least questionable whether the FCC
should, as it did in that case, simply withdraw and say, "Oh, we don't really
know whether we have authority on this matter or not, so we will step out
for now." It was dysfunctional to bypass the regulatory agency and to leave
the matter to the construction of the abundance of telecommunications is-
sues that had to be dealt with to an able, but burdened, single judge, who
then had to go through nearly a million of pages of material in deciding
what the outcome of that case should be.
Rosenblum, The Development of the Doctrine of Primary Jurisdiction, 16 TRANSP.
L. J. 106, 108-09 (1987).
147. Of course, the technology permitting new entrants would not have been pos-
sible without the requirement that Bell Labs share its breakthroughs in satellite and
microwave communications with its rivals. But even if Bell Labs had not been re-
quired to share its technology, it would have slowed, but not stopped, the emergence
of new entries in lucrative long-distance markets.
148. These are rather complex and important questions. One is reminded of the
ancient Chinese curse: "may you live in interesting times."
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A. Federal Preemption and Federalism
The line of demarcation between federal and state jurisdic-
tion becomes increasingly important in an era where the
FCC's approach is toward deregulation and a shifting of costs
from the long-distance interstate to the local intrastate tele-
phone system. Since the decision in Louisiana Public Service
Comm'n v. FCC,149 the states clearly have exclusive jurisdic-
tion to adopt their own regulatory approach within their
boundaries. But there is no doubt that drawing the jurisdic-
tional lines will continue to be a controversial legal endeavor.
FCC attempts to preempt state regulatory activity flourished
in the 1970s. The first major victory for the Commission was a
decision preempting state regulation of the interconnection of
consumer-provided equipment. 5 ° Since then, the FCC has
preempted the states in areas such as enhanced services,1"' ac-
cess charges, 15 2 nonvideo cable, 53 private lines,5 4 FM radio
common carriers,155 microwave radio services,'5 6 "comparably
efficient interconnection," and "open network architecture.' 5 7
FCC efforts to preempt intrastate PUC regulation appear to
have had two objectives. The first was the Reagan Adminis-
tration theology of deregulation. The second was to shift costs
from the interstate to the intrastate system and, ultimately, to
the basic exchange service, which had heretofore been priced
below cost.'58 Theoretically, this policy promotes competition
149. 476 U.S. 355 (1986). See infra text accompanying notes 160-65 for discussion
of Louisiana.
150. North Carolina Utilities Comm'n v. FCC, 537 F.2d 787 (4th Cir. 1976), cert.
denied, 429 U.S. 1027 (1976); North Carolina Utilities Comm'n v. FCC, 552 F.2d 1036
(4th Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 874 (1977).
151. 77 F.C.C.2d 384 (1980); recon., 84 F.C.C.2d 50 (1981),further recon., 88 F.C.C.
2d 512 (1981).
152. MTS/WATS Market Structure, Third Report and Order, 93 F.C.C.2d 241
(1983), modified on recon., 97 F.C.C.2d 834 (1984), aff'd and remanded in part sub
nom. National Ass'n of Regulatory Utility Commissioners v. FCC, 737 F.2d 1095
(D.C. Cir. 1984), cert. denied, 105 S. Ct. 1224 (1985).
153. Memorandum Opinion, Declaratory Riding and Order, File No. CCB-DFB-
83-1, FCC 85-455 (released Sept. 5, 1985).
154. Memorandum Opinion and Order, FCC 84-368 (released July 25, 1985).
155. Memorandum Opinion, FCC 84-187 (released May 1984).
156. On the Matter of the Amendment of Part 94 of the Commission's Rules and
Regulations, PR Docket No. 83-426 (released April 1, 1985).
157. See Miller, Ideology, Jurisdiction, and Deregulation of the Telephone Net-
work, PUB. UTIL. FORT., Oct. 2, 1986 at 14.
158. The position of the FCC is that eventually none of the MTS costs should be
borne by the interstate system, or by any other potentially competitive service. The
FCC sought to achieve this by imposing a flat access charge upon all telephone users.
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and discourages an inefficient bypass of the public switched
network. 5 9
However, the FCC's preemption efforts were dealt a serious
blow by U.S. Supreme Court's decision in Louisiana.6 0  The
case involved an appeal of FCC decisions which prescribed ac-
celerated methods of depreciation in the rate-setting of intra-
state telephone service. 1 6 ' Twenty-three states objected to this
policy on grounds that several provisions of the Communica-
tions Act of 1934 explicitly vested jurisdiction over intrastate
telecommunications in the states. 6 2
Ruling against the FCC and twenty-six private telephone
companies (including AT&T), the Court, with Justice Brennan
writing for the majority, found that "this provision fences off
from FCC reach or regulation intrastate matters-indeed, in-
cluding matters in connection with intrastate service.' 1 63
Although the majority recognized that there was no clear line
separating interstate from intrastate operations, it concluded
that the Communications Act of 1934 established "a system of
dual state and federal regulation over telephone ser-
vice. . . The Court found that the FCC simply did not
A "carrier's carrier charge" is assessed upon long-distance companies according to
use of lines; an "end-user access charge" is paid by customers according to the
number of lines he has. The FCC originally intended that these costs be shifted to
end-users over a five year period. Public and congressional criticism of the level of
the end-user charge led the FCC to reduce them.
159. "Bypass" refers to avoiding the established local public switched network,
the system all have traditionally used to place calls. There are two types of bypass:
economic and uneconomic. Economic bypass occurs where the competitor taking the
traffic away from the incumbent enjoys lower marginal costs of providing the service
in question. It is consistent with a competitive market. In contrast, uneconomic by-
pass exists where the regulatory pricing structure creates an artificially high price,
and a higher marginal cost entrant steals the traffic from a lower marginal cost in-
cumbent merely because of the artificially set differential. Uneconomic bypass is
more wasteful of society's resources.
160. 476 U.S. 355 (1986).
161. Property Depreciation, 83 F.C.C.2d 267 (1980), recon. denied, 87 F.C.C.2d 916
(1981).
162. Section 152(b) of the Act provides that "nothing in this chapter shall be con-
structed to apply or to give the commission jurisdiction with respect to (1) charges,
classifications, practices, services, facilities, or regulations for or in connection with
intrastate communication service .... 47 U.S.C. § 152(b)
163. 476 U.S. at 370.
164. Justice Brennan noted:
However, while the Act would seem to divide the world of domestic tele-
phone service neatly into two hemispheres-one comprised of interstate ser-
vice, over which the FCC would have plenary authority, and the other made
up of intrastate service, over which the States would retain exclusive juris-
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have the authority to encourage competition in the telecom-
munications industry, and that FCC efforts to impose its will
on the states regarding depreciation methods was ultra
vires. 16 5
B. The State PUCs: A Regulatory Checkerboard
Since divestiture, the state PUCs have had to decide
whether to allow increased competition in the intrastate tele-
communications market. The question stems from Judge
Greene's decision to authorize the RBOCs to provide long-dis-
tance service, on an intraLATA basis, and from the Louisiana
decision, allowing the RBOCs to adopt the intrastate approach
they deem best serves the public interest.166
A number of telephone companies have urged state legisla-
tures and public utility commissions to deregulate what they
perceive to be potentially competitive sectors of the market.
For example, US West, among the most aggressive of the
RBOCs, called for "big bang" deregulation. 167
As noted above, state PUCs have traditionally tended to
hold local residential rates below the marginal cost of produc-
tion, while allowing the telephone companies to earn supra-
competitive profits on toll usage and urban and commercial
customers, so as to provide a basis for cross-subsidy. Many
telephone companies assert that with emerging technology
making more of the system competitive, competitors are at-
diction-in practice, the realities of technology and economics belie such a
clean parceling of responsibility. This is so because virtually all telephone
facilities that are used to provide intrastate service are also used to provide
interstate service, and are thus conceivably within the jurisdiction of both
state and federal authorities. Moreover, because the same carriers provide
both interstate and intrastate service, actions taken by federal and state reg-
ulators within their respective domains necessarily affect the general finan-
cial health of those carriers, and hence their ability to provide service, in the
other "hemisphere."
Id. at 360.
165. The Louisiana decision may well have important implications beyond the
immediate question of rates of depreciation. For example, the FCC had suggested
that it, rather than the states, would determine whether the RBOCs would be per-
mitted to diversify into industries other than telephone service. If the FCC is pre-
empted, the states will decide such issues as intrastate diversification.
166. Market Entry and Rate Regulation of Intrastate Telephone Service, 114 PUB.
UTIL. FORT. Sept. 27, 1984 at 50.
167. "Where we used to advocate gradual, product-by-product deregulation, we
now support a 'Big Bang' approach." Glesne, Status of Deregulation (Regulatory),
MOUNTAIN BELL ACADEMIC SEMINAR 81, 83 (1986). More recently, US West has
taken a more moderate position toward regulatory reform.
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tracted to the more lucrative customers, and "bypass" becomes
a threat.6 ' They allege that as the commercial business users
exit the system, there will be significant upward pressure on
local residential rates (i.e., residential customers will be forced
to shoulder a greater portion of the fixed cost burden). So
long as business customers remain in the system, they con-
tinue to make some contribution to fixed costs. Therefore,
many telephone companies contend that they must be free
from rate-of-return regulation in competitive markets and al-
lowed to price in a manner that will keep the larger users on
the system, reducing rates where competitors are vying for
their business. Such regulatory freedom, it is argued, will in
the long run ameliorate the upward pressure on local residen-
tial rates. But there is rather little empirical evidence of sig-
nificant "bypass" to date.'
A substantial number of states continue to adhere to rate-of-
return regulation, which entails strict telephone company jus-
tification of all tariffs and limits-returns on prudently
incurred investment to those rates of return earned by busi-
nesses with comparable risks. 7 ° More than thirty states have
abandoned-this traditional approach.' 7 ' Four alternatives have
emerged. From least to most deregulatory in nature, they are:
(1) service-by-service flexibility; (2) incentive regulation; (3)
social contract regulation; and (4) de facto deregulation. 72
168. See supra text accompanying note 147.
169. Indeed, diversion from MTS and local exchange service as well as facility
bypass at the BOC level appears to have been inconsequential. Trebing, Regulation
of Industry: An Institutionalist Approach, 12 J. ECON. ISSUES 1707, 1736 n.41 (1987).
170. See generally W. JONES, REGULATED INDUSTRIES Chap. 3-4 (2d ed. 1976).
171. Megdal & Lain, A Comparison of Alternative Methods for Regulating Local
Exchange Companies (address before the Sixth NARUC Biennial Regulatory Infor-
mation Conference, Columbus, Ohio, August 1988).
172. Id. at 8. One source, reviewing the approaches of the states and the District
of Columbia, divided the approaches into more categories than these:
* 36 (of 38) multi-LATA states permit facilities-based interLATA toll com-
petition. Resale competition is permitted in all multi-LATA states.
* 14 states permit facilities-based intraLATA toll competition; 4 more states
will allow it by January 1, 1987. Resale competition is permitted in 38
states, including 6 single-LATA states.
e 28 states permit price flexibility for interexchange carriers, including
AT&T.
* 23 states have approved reductions in the intrastate common carrier line
charge (CCLC).
e 6 states have implemented an intrastate residential subscriber line charge
(SLC).
9 35 states permit price flexibility for local exchange carriers. Forty-four
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Some twenty states have adopted the service-by-service ap-
proach, making it the most popular of the four alternatives. 173
Usually, it allows the PUC to designate those sectors of tele-
communications that are competitive, and to deregulate or
detariff them.
Incentive regulation involves a rate of return band, in which
the firm is allowed to keep all returns up to a designated level
and required to share profits with consumers after hitting that
threshold. This gives the telephone company an economic in-
centive to become more efficient and reduce costs. 174 The New
York Commission adopted a "rate stability plan" that calls for
profit flexibility and the sharing of excess earnings, but re-
tains rate-of-return regulation.17 Specifically, New York Tele-
phone can keep half of the profits exceeding its targeted 14%
rate of return, while rebating the other half to its custom-
ers. 76 Wisconsin adopted a similar plan, which holds the al-
lowable rate of return to between 13.5% and 14.25%,
permitting the phone company to retain all the profit it earns
up to 13.75%, and requiring it to split its profit between 13.75%
and 14.25% with customers.1 7 7 New Jersey and Alabama have
also adopted rate stability plans.7 8
Under the third alternative, social contract regulation,
prices are capped or allowed to increase at the rate of inflation
on local services for a designated period of time, while other
competitive services are deregulated. 79 Under this form of
states have authorized price stability plans for Centrex, while 40 have also
offset the Federal SLC.
e 15 states have passed legislation authorizing their PUCs to deregulate or
detariff "competitive" services.
e 45 states and the District of Columbia have authorized local measured ser-
vice (LMS).
0 12 states and the District of Columbia have adopted lifeline programs, of
which 9 have been accepted by the FCC for participation in the federal
lifeline assistance program.
e 32 states have approved shared tenant services (STS), although the regu-
latory treatment of STS in these states varies substantially.
OFFICE OF POLICY ANALYSIS AND DEVELOPMENT, U.S. DEPT. OF COMMERCE, TELE-
PHONE COMPETITION AND DEREGULATION: A SURVEY OF THE STATES II, III (1986).
173. Megdal & Lain, supra note 171, at 9
174. Id. at 11-12.
175. See Schwartz, supra note 37, at 33-34.
176. Roberts, Ceilings on Phone-Company Earnings Are Being Chipped Away by
Regulators, Wall St. J., Apr. 21, 1987, at 50.
177. Id.
178. Megdal & Lain, supra note 171.
179. Id. at 13-14.
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light-handed regulation, local residential customers are pro-
tected against abandonment and radical upward surges in pric-
ing. The Vermont Public Service Board has adopted a "social
contract" approach to local exchange service whereby the
quality and maximum prices of certain fundamental services
are regulated, and others are open to competition. The price
of local telephone service is frozen for several years, while the
telephone company's rate of return is deregulated. In theory,
this gives the company an incentive to become more efficient,
and thus increase its profits."' 0 In 1980, Michigan was the first
state to adopt the "social contract" approach.' 8 '
By far the most ambitious de facto deregulation legislation
was that passed in Nebraska in 1986.182 It allows telephone
companies to raise telephone rates by up to 10% during any
12-month period without PUC approval. If, however, 2% to
5% of a company's customers petition for regulatory review,
the PUC will review the proposed increase. This legislation
essentially frees telephone companies to earn whatever profits
they are capable of achieving.8 3 It is anticipated that Ne-
braska's business telephone rates will fall, while local rates
rise."'
As for PUC regulation of intrastate long-distance, the paths
have been nearly as varied. In 1984, the Virginia commission
declared that all interexchange carriers would be treated
alike; profits and prices would be deregulated, but tariff filing
requirements and the complaint process would be retained. In
1987, the state of Washington concluded that AT&T operated
in a competitive market and waived certain regulations involv-
ing profits and prices, while retaining restrictions on abandon-
ment and statewide de-averaging of rates.'85
Since divestiture, a dozen states have abandoned traditional
rate-base, rate-of-return regulation of AT&T's intrastate oper-
180. Roberts, supra note 176 at 50.
181. Megdal & Lain, supra note 171, at 14.
182. NEB. REV. STAT. § 86-803 (1986).
183. Nebraska Law Deregulating Phone Rates May Spur Some Changes in Other
States, Wall St. J., May 12, 1986, at 7 [hereinafter Nebraska Spurs Changes]. Across
the ocean, the United Kingdom has privatized its telephone industry, while prohibit-
ing price increases to residential customers of more than three percentage points
below the consumer price index.
184. Id. US West may be reluctant to charge Nebraska customers whatever the
market will bear, for that might jeopardize efforts to achieve de facto deregulation
in the other states.
185. Id. at 7.
HASTINGS COMM/ENT L. J.
ations, and sixteen states have liberalized the regulatory re-
gime. In regulating AT&T, three basic approaches have been
taken: (1) a "banded" rate approach with a ceiling and floor on
rates; (2) rate caps; and (3) de facto deregulation.8 6
Former FCC Chairman Mark Fowler urged states to joinin
a three-year experiment in deregulation, pursuant to which
telephone companies would be free to eliminate subsidies in
favor of local residential service, raise rates, and enter new
businesses without prior approval by state or federal regula-
tors.8 7 More recently, the FCC itself has shifted its regulatory
focus away from AT&T's return on investment, instead setting
a cap on the company's prices while allowing it to earn
whatever return can be achieved with greater efficiency of
operations. 18 8
C. The FCC's Rate-of-Return Deregulation
Traditional rate base, rate-of-return regulation has its
problems: (1) the administrative process entails significant
costs; (2) there is a regulatory lag between the date the rate is
filed and the date it becomes effective; and (3) the methodol-
ogy may create disincentives for efficiency.
The latter problem is particularly pernicious. Traditional
rate regulation may encourage lethargic cost control because
increased operating expenses are usually paid by rate payers
rather than the firm's stockholders, 189 while a firm's cost say-
186. * States such as Arizona and Kansas have adopted "banded" rates,
where the state approves a floor price and ceiling price for AT&T
services and allows free price movement within the upper and lower
limits.
* Other states, such as Tennessee and Idaho, have approved rate ceil-
ings or caps, giving AT&T permission to move prices freely so long as
they stay below the prescribed maximum price.
* States like Maryland or Nevada have opted for giving AT&T full
pricing flexibility that allows AT&T to adjust prices as business con-
ditions dictate.
States Adopt Three Primary Approaches to Easing AT&T's Regulation, 5 STATE
TELEPHONE REG. REP. 6 (June 18, 1987).
187. See Fowler, Halpin & Schlichting, "Back to the Future": A Model for Tele-
communications, 38 FED. COMM. L.J. 145 (1986).
188. In the Matter of Policy and Rules Concerning Rates for Dominant Carriers,
CC Docket No. 87-313, FCC 88-172, 53 Fed. Reg. 37384 [hereinafter FCC Rate Cap
Rules]. The final rules were announced March 16, 1989, to be effective July 1, 1989.
FCC Adopts Price Cap Regulation for AT&T, PUB. UTIL. FORT. 33 (Apr. 27, 1989)
[hereinafter AT&T Price Cap].
189. This is true except in those rare instances where the regulatory agency finds
that the costs were not prudently incurred.
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ings are penalized by lowering the company's gross revenues,
passing the benefit through to rate payers.19 Moreover, in-
vesting in the rate base increases a firm's return to sharehold-
ers; thus, there is a powerful incentive to build plants.
Nevertheless, telephone rates have only doubled since 1935,
while the consumer price index has increased eightfold.' 91
Since divestiture, the FCC has applied traditional rate-of-re-
turn methodology to lower long-distance rates.1 92 By limiting
AT&T to a 12.2% return on its $9.1 billion interstate long-dis-
tance investment, the FCC has enabled consumers to enjoy
more than a 30% reduction in long-distance rates.193 For the
most part, however, these reductions reflect decreases in long-
distance carriers' connection charges 94 that have been shifted
to customers whose local access charges have increased from
$0 to $42 a year. Hence, to describe this as an unqualified pric-
ing benefit to consumers would be misleading. In fact, any
benefit flows to heavy long-distance users-on average, a
wealthier class of consumers. The following table reflects
these price reductions:
AT&T Long-Distance Price Reductions Since Divestiture
May 1984 6.4%
June 1985 5.6%
June 1986 11.8%
January 1987 11.4%
July 1987 4.8%
January 1988 3.5%
TOTAL 37.0%
190. See generally Strasser, Bonus and Penalty Plans to Improve Public Utility
Performance: Lessons From the Cases, 19 CONN. L. REV. 513 (1987).
191. Guyon, FCC Hopes New Regulations Will Cut Phone Rates-But Others
Aren't So Sure, Wall St. J., Aug. 7, 1987, at 27.
192. Remember that during divestiture long-distance rates were set at a level well
above marginal costs in order to cross-subsidize losses incurred on local service.
193. There is a bit of speculation on the streets that the FCC-mandated reduction
in toll rates was motivated by Chairman Mark Fowler's desire to prove that divesti-
ture and partial deregulation have been a success.
194. Phone rates in the past 50 years have risen only one-fourth as much as
the [consumer price index], according to a recent FCC study, and reductions
in local connection charges are the main reason long distance prices have
declined so markedly in the past three years. Indeed, AT&T says such con-
nection charges account for half its costs.
Guyon, Regulators May Give AT&T a Big Lift, Wall St. J., June 25, 1987, at 6, col. 1
[hereinafter AT&T Lift].
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While the FCC does not actively regulate the rates of MCI,
Sprint, and the other small long-distance carriers, 95 these car
riers generally mirror the AT&T price reductions with corre-
sponding reductions of their own, attempting to gain market
share by underpricing AT&T. For example, since these FCC
mandated price reductions began, the price differential be-
tween MCI's rates and AT&T's rates for residential users has
dwindled from a high of 50% to an average of 3.5%.196 This
has put a serious squeeze on the profitability of the smaller
carriers. Nevertheless, former FCC Chairman Mark Fowler
optimistically insisted, "We have every reason to believe that
competition is alive, well and very feisty.' '197
Early in 1987, however, MCI filed a proposal with the FCC
to ease restrictions on AT&T, a move designed to halt the
Commission's mandated price cuts which have eroded profits
throughout the industry.'9 8 As one source noted, "Over the
past two years, MCI has seen its profit crushed by industry-
wide price cuts prompted by the Federal Communications
Commission's regulation of AT&T."' 99 The following table
provides some incomplete data on industry profits:
Profitability of Long-Distance Carriers (in $ million)200
1984 1985 1986 1987
AT&T income $1370 $1557 $139 $2044
AT&T revenue $33187 $34417 $34087 $33598
MCI income ($59) $113 ($448) $88
MCI revenue $1959 $2542 $3592 $3939
Sprint income ($357)* ($492)**
* last two quarters, 1986
** first two quarters, 1987
195. The FCC has jurisdiction over all interstate carriers, but regulates all but
AT&T with a light-handed approach known as "forbearance," a type of benign ne-
glect. Divestiture's Pyre, supra note 7, at 9.
196. Schwadel, MCI to Trim Interstate Phone Rates 10% In Response to AT&T's
Steep Reductions, Wall St. J., Jan. 23, 1987, at 4, col. 2.
197. Davis, AT&T Ordered By FCC to Cut Certain Rates, Wall St. J., Dec. 31, 1986,
at 2, col. 1.
198. Guyon, AT&T Asks FCC To End Regulation Limiting Its Profit, Wall St. J.,
Mar. 9, 1987, at 18 [hereinafter AT&T Deregulation].
199. Schwadel, MCI's Stance Eases on AT&T Deregulation, Wall St. J., Mar. 5,
1987, at 4, col. 1.
200. Wall St. J., Mar. 5, 1987, at 4; Rocky Mountain News, Apr. 17, 1988, at 78;
Wall St. J., July 17, 1987, at 6; AT&T, 1987 ANNUAL REPORT 16 (1988).
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AT&T followed suit with a proposal that -its profit margin
be deregulated.20 1 It argued that it should be given the same
freedom to tailor its prices to individual customers. To put it
differently, AT&T wanted to engage in the same type of pric-
ing discrimination in which MCI and Sprint are free to
engage.2 0 2
The Reagan Administration's FCC consistently took a posi-
tion that favored deregulation.20 3 Under Chairman Dennis
Patrick, who sought to deregulate AT&T, the Federal Com-
munications Commission abandoned rate-of-return regulation
for AT&T, instead imposing a rate cap of 3% below annual
inflation.2 4 This frees the company to earn a return on in-
vestment determined solely by the market.20 5 Chairman Pat-
rick claimed that this would reduce rates by $1.6 billion over a
four-year period.20 6
Although some states have benefitted under these plans, in
at least three states rates have declined moderately, while
AT&T's profits have soared.20 7 In some states which deregu-
lated profits, AT&T's profits have jumped 125%.218 In Vir-
ginia, the price of intrastate toll calls has risen 24% since
profits were deregulated in 1984.209 Some state officials have
been skeptical as to whether replacing profit regulation with a
ceiling on prices encourages pricing competition; it may in-
201. AT&T Deregulation, supra note 198; Guyon, AT&T Favors Pragmatic Route
to Resuming Growth, Wall St. J., Feb. 13, 1987, at 6.
202. AT&T Seeks Freedom to Set Phone Rates, Rocky Mountain News, May 11,
1988, at 31. So as to match the pricing flexibility of its competitors and stem the loss
of large business accounts, in December 1988, AT&T proposed that it be allowed to
offer its customers promotional discounts of up to 27% for its main data transmission
service. This would result in discounts of up to $50 million a year. Guyon, AT&T
Proposes Discount Program, Cuts In Prices for Data Transmission Service, Wall St.
J., Dec. 8, 1988, at A3.
203. Roberts & Davis, AT&T Will Seek To End Oversight By Justice Department,
Wall St. J., Dec. 5, 1986, at 2. See generally Fowler, Halpin, & Schlichting, supra
note 187; Dempsey, supra note 35, at 3, 26-29.
204. Davis, FCC Proposes Altering System On Phone Rates, Wall St. J., May 13,
1988, at 2, col. 2.
205. Davis, FCC Proposes Changing Rules On AT&T Rates, Wall St. J., Aug. 5,
1987, at 3, col. 1 [hereinafter FCC Proposal].
206. Schwadel, supra note 196.
207. Guyon, AT&T Profits On Price-Cap Alternative, Wall St. J., Sept. 2, 1987, at 6
[hereinafter AT&T Profits].
208. Guyon, AT&T Sees Glimmerings of Turnaround, Wall St. J., Nov. 12, 1987, at
2.
209. AT&T Profits, supra note 207.
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stead create an informal cartel with AT&T setting the price
ceiling for its smaller rivals.21 °
Further deregulation of AT&T has been widely opposed.
Consumer groups and businesses have alleged that there will
be little public benefit if prices rather than profits are
capped.21' It has been argued that a deregulated AT&T would
de-average pricing, so that rates to small towns and rural com-
munities would be higher than rates to large cities.21 2 While
long-distance prices have fallen more than 30% under FCC-
mandated price reductions, some contend that after deregula-
tion prices would not fall as fast as they have under FCC man-
dates, and rates would rise for services where AT&T was the
monopoly carrier.1 Gene Kimmelman, legislative director of
the Consumer Federation of America, criticized the rate-cap
proposal as being a "back-door bailout of the long-distance in-
dustry. It's an attempt to cover up the failure of competi-
tion. ' 214 Recently, MCI and Sprint have also shunned the
rate-cap because the FCC proposal gives AT&T excessive rate
flexibility and imposes no price floors. Together these two
factors enable AT&T to raid MCI and Sprint customers in the
same way they raided AT&T's customer base.21 ' Additionally,
one FCC Commissioner has expressed concern that incentives
to cut costs to maximize profitability may well have a deleteri-
ous effect upon service.2 16
Many in Congress resist the proposal on grounds that a der-
egulated AT&T would raise prices to residential users and
lower prices to business customers.217 Congressman Edward
Markey (D.-Mass.), chairman of the House Telecommunica-
tions Subcommittee, said, "The price cap is the FCC's social
welfare plan to redistribute the wealth from telephone cus-
210. Id.
211. AT&T Price Cap, supra note 188, at 34.
212. AT&dT Deregulation, supra note 198.
213. AT&T Lift, supra note 194.
214. FCC Proposal, supra note 205, at 3.
215. Guyon & Davis, FCC Proposal for Phone Deregulation Plan Hits Snag, Wall
St. J., Feb. 12, 1988, at 4, col. 1 [hereinafter FCC Snag]. See A Trimmer Heavyweight
in a Scrappy Marketplace, INSIGHT, Apr. 17, 1989, at 13.
216. FCC Rate Cap Rules, supra note 188 (separate statement of Patricia Diaz
Dennis).
217. This is something the other long-distance companies are free to do. Davis,
Commerce Agency Urges Deregulation of AT&T, Says Business Is Competitive, Wall
St. J., July 23, 1987, at 15.
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tomers to telephone company stockholders. ' 21  Several bills
have been introduced in Congress opposing the FCC
initiative.2 1 9
D. The DOJ's Proposed Line of Business Restriction Removal
The Modified Final Judgement (MFJ) ordering the reorgan-
ization of AT&T220 also prohibited the RBOCs from manufac-
turing equipment, engaging in interexchange interLATA (toll)
services, and originating information services. Under the
MFJ, Judge Greene retained jurisdiction to approve invest-
ments by the former Bell System firms in other lines of busi-
ness. Since the original decision, he has approved proposals to
allow the RBOCs to enter into such businesses as real estate,
insurance and financial services. 221
In 1987, the DOJ stepped forward with a commissioned re-
port authored by Dr. Peter Huber, recommending that Judge
Greene waive most of the RBOCs' line-of-business restric-
tions.22 2 The DOJ report recommended that the RBOCs be al-
lowed to compete in long-distance, provide computer services,
manufacture telephone equipment, and engage in other
businesses.
223
Consumer advocate Gene Kimmelman described the propo-
sal as "outlandish. ' 224 Referring to the fact that divestiture
218. FCC Proposal, supra note 205.
219. FCC Snag, supra note 215. See also Sandler, Some in Congress Urge FCC to
Set Aside Plans for Regulatory System for AT&T, Wall St. J., Sept. 30, 1988, at 8, col.
2. Some of the BOCs have been so encouraged by the FCC proposal that they have
proposed similar legislation at the state level. This, too, has met stiff opposition.
Because the BOCs are a monopoly, Gene Kimmelman describes these proposals as
"an unprecedented perversion of public policy." Id.
220. See supra text accompanying notes 124-36 (discussion of MFJ).
221. Pastor & Davis, Removal of Curbs On Former Bell Firms Is Recommended
by Justice Department, Wall St. J., Feb. 3, 1987, at 3. The Federal Court of Appeals
for the District of Columbia Circuit reversed Judge Greene's prohibition against
RBOC ownership of cellular and paging operations outside their territories. U.S. v.
Western Electric Co., 797 F.2d 1082 (D.C. Cir. 1986). This ruling apparently frees the
seven RBOCs to acquire independent telephone companies in each other's
territories.
222. P. Huber, The Geodesic Network, 1987 Report on Competition in the Tele-
phone Industry (unpublished manuscript 1987). The principal exception to the rec-
ommendation is that BOCs be prohibited from providing interexchange service
terminating or originating in their own territories. The DOJ also insisted that state
regulatory restrictions be removed. Wenders, On Modifying the MFJ, TELECOMMU-
NICATIONS POL'Y, Sept. 1987, at 243.
223. Pastor & Davis, supra note 221.
224. Id.
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was premised on the anticompetitive opportunities which exist
as a result of the monopoly bottleneck which local telephone
companies have on the telecommunications system, he said,
"They have forgotten the whole history of what got us into
this mess." '225 Kimmelman's position is supported by the
Modified Final Judgment, in which Judge Greene noted that
"the principal means by which AT&T has maintained monop-
oly power in telecommunications has been through its control
of the Operating Companies with their strategic bottleneck po-
sition." '226 Judge Greene severely restricted RBOC entrance
into the interexchange market because he found that to allow
unfettered access "would be to undermine the very purpose of
the proposed decree-to create a truly competitive environ-
ment in the telecommunications industry. '227
Kimmelman predicted that implementation of the DOJ pro-
posal would cause local rates to rise significantly and drive
smaller competitors out of business. 228 AT&T also criticized
the plan as anticompetitive and anti-consumer. 229
Although Judge Greene blundered by allowing divestiture,
he has exhibited post-divestiture prudence by refusing to get
caught up in the deregulatory euphoria of the Reagan Admin-
istration. He has denied most of the DOJ's sweeping recom-
mendations, allowed the RBOCs to distribute information
services provided by other companies, and removed all con-
straints from entering non-communications businesses.23 ° The
RBOCs may not, however, manufacture equipment or enter
the long-distance interLATA business:
Whatever others may do, the Court will continue to decline to
regard divestiture as an end in itself, as a mere deregulatory
gesture for the sake of deregulation. Divestiture and the line
of business restrictions have as their basic purpose the re-
moval of anticompetitive impediments, to the end that the
rates that consumers pay will be reasonable and unimpeded
by fair competition, and that all segments of society, including
the poor, the old, the infirm, and those living in isolated rural
225. Id.
226. United States v. AT&T, 552 F. Supp. 131 (1982).
227. Id.
228. Pastor & Davis, supra note 221.
229. Roberts, Phone Firms Hail Deregulation Proposal As a Boon for Competi-
tion, Consumers, Wall St. J., Feb. 3, 1987, at 20.
230. Many, if not most, of these non-communications ventures have, to date, not
been profitable.
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areas will in consequence have access to necessary telephone
service.2 3 '
Judge Greene now seems to recognize that deregulation is
not an end in itself; it is a means to an end.232 The objective is
a healthy competitive environment, which often requires
more, not less, government control. Moreover, Judge Greene
seems to have torn a page from the Parable of the Great Fish
in that he now pledges fidelity to the policy of universal ser-
vice-an objective antithetical to divestiture:
The local loop (the line which connects a consumer with the
telephone company's switches) remains a "bottleneck". It is a
natural monopoly with few realistic competitive alterna-
tives.2 33 The BOCs could use this "bottleneck" to discriminate
against competing telecommunications firms in other lines of
business, or to exploit captive customers.2 34
It must be remembered that the RBOCs are huge companies
with tremendous monopoly potential. Together they have an
annual cash flow of more than $20 billion, and more than 2.5
times the assets of IBM.235 The local loop and switches consti-
tute a bottleneck with tremendous monopoly potential. 36 Un-
doubtedly, they would sell for more than book value, because
231. United States v. Western Electric Co., Inc., U.S. (D.D.C.), Civil Action No.
82-0192, Sept. 10, 1987.
232. Even deregulation advocate Roger Noll has recognized that the line of busi-
ness restrictions are necessary to facilitate competitive opportunities in the industry,
at least for now. Noll, The Twisted Pair, AEI J. ON GOV'T & Soc'Y, at 15, 20 (Nos.
3/4 1987).
233. Wenner, Phone Companies Ought to 'Bundle,' Wall St. J., Oct. 15, 1987, at 32.
234. Id. Judge Greene recently summarized the monopoly posture of the BOCs
which makes it imprudent to allow them to enter the long-distance market, or to
engage in further deregulation:
It is ... said that the regional companies are only asking for a level playing
field, for an opportunity to compete on equal terms with others in long dis-
tance, manufacturing, and information services. But these companies con-
tinue to have a tight hold on the essential facilities represented by the local
telephone switches and circuits, which all of their potential competitors
must utilize if they wish to reach the consuming public. We have heard no
offer from the telephone companies to give up these local bottlenecks to
some third party having no interest in competitive businesses. They want
both-monopoly and competition.
H. Greene, The Antitrust Laws, Telecommunications and Consumers 11 (unpub-
lished address before the Consumers Federation of America, Feb. 5, 1988) (on file at
COMM/ENT office).
235. Wenner, supra note 233, at 32.
236. The cost of duplication would be prohibitive and wasteful. While several of
the RBOCs argue in favor of freedom to enter long-distance interstate services, none
seems to be willing to sell their local loops for the privilege of entry.
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the sum of the local residential rates, the local access charges,
and the interstate and intrastate carrier access charges, indi-
cate that local services are highly profitable today.237 Further,
if the carrier access charges are market sustainable (and they
appear to be, for there is relatively little bypass), then these
charges are really not a subsidy at all, but are merely the price
paid by the toll carriers for access to the RBOCs' customers.
Moreover, even if the RBOCs were willing to sell the local
bottleneck of loops and switches and become interstate long-
distance carriers, one wonders whether they would want the
local loop deregulated. A deregulated local company could
charge toll carriers an access fee as high as the market would
bear, which would be whatever the long-distance carriers
would pay before bypass became significant.
Recently, Judge Greene has been critical of both the DOJ's
lethargy in enforcing the MFJ and the FCC's deregulation-in-
spired encouragement of telecommunications companies to
disobey the MFJ's line-of-business restrictions.238 Indeed, a
deregulated monopoly would be a disaster for consumers. For
now, at least, the telecommunications industry is in able
hands, which keep them out of interLATA toll, information,
and equipment manufacturing markets in which they might
exploit their local monopoly opportunities.
V
The Costs and Benefits of Divestiture and
Deregulation
Divestiture and deregulation, although they have produced
some significant benefits, have not created the nirvana that
their proponents predicted.239 Increasingly, the empirical re-
sults are amassing into a body of evidence that calls into
question not only the means by which divestiture was accom-
plished, but also the ends.
After divestiture, many claimed that the consumer would
237. As of 1986, local telephone rate increases totaled $5 billion, and additional
$20 billion was earned by the RBOCs in access charges in 1984 and 1985. Spievack,
supra note 131, at 14.
238. Davis, AT&T Case Judge Berates Regulators, Reaffirms Manufacturing Ban
On Bells, Wall St. J., Dec. 4, 1987, at 2, col. 3.
239. "[T]elephone service is worse and more expensive now than it was [before
divestiture] .... " Guyon, Assessing the Dismemberment of Ma Bell, Wall St. J., Jan.
23, 1987, at 19.
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have to endure local rate increases of as much as 80%, as well
as a reduction in the quality of telephone service and delayed
technological improvements.240 As noted, not all the pessimis-
tic predictions have materialized, but even America's most
prominent business periodicals have been critical of the
divestiture:
Before the breakup of [AT&T] everybody was telling us
that monopolistic Ma Bell was almost as dangerous to the na-
tional health as Typhoid Mary. But [we are now] left with a
fractious industry market, spotty service and the domination
of-who else-AT&T and its seven former regional phone
companies. And the regulators, who only a few years ago sac-
rificed the best public utility in the world on the altar of
greater competition, are now ordering deep pricing cuts in
AT&T's long-distance service-a move that will surely drive
most of its competitors out of business.
How did we get into this mess?241
This early in the first decade A.D. (after divestiture), it may
be too soon to draw definitive conclusions as to whether tele-
communications divestiture and deregulation is, on balance, a
success or failure.242 Nonetheless, it is still useful to examine
the costs and benefits of divestiture and partial deregulation of
telecommunications, to help determine the efficacy of the
MFJ.
A. Local Rate Increases vs. Long-Distance Decreases
The major problem posed by divestiture was how to deal
with the cross-subsidies within the Bell System-of long-dis-
240. The Commerce Department projected that conditions such as regulatory
changes in accounting requirements, depreciation adjustments, and inflation would
cause local rates to increase over a five-year period from an average of $9.16 to about
$16.16 per month. Florida regulators predicted monthly local rates of $25 to $30 by
1986. Investment cutbacks leading to reductions in the quality of service and delayed
introduction of technological improvements were predicted. Increased disparities of
service quality between business and residential customers, with business being fa-
vored, were predicted. Telephone rate increases of 80% were predicted. MacAvoy &
Robinson, supra note 29, at 37-42.
241. Who's To Blame for the Phone Mess, Bus. WK., Feb. 23, 1987, at 21 [hereinaf-
ter Phone Mess].
242. In fact, it may never be possible to say that this drastic change in telecommu-
nications policy is clearly a masterpiece or a disaster, for there are inevitably win-
ners and losers in so sudden and profound a change in public policy as this. To date,
it appears that large businesses and heavy toll users are the winners, and the far
more numerous local residential customers are the losers. Those with greater
wealth appear to have benefitted, while those without wealth appear to be worse off.
This, of course, raises distributional concerns.
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tance profits cross-subsidizing local service, of business profits
cross-subsidizing residential service, and of urban profits cross-
subsidizing rural service.243 Traditionally, the cross subsidies
were designed to effectuate universal service. With open entry
in the long-distance market, the cross-subsidy could not long
be sustained. Competition pushed rates of return down to
marginal costs. If prices fell in long-distance services, then the
revenues of the long-distance carriers, predominantly AT&T,
would also fall. If revenues fell, then cross-subsidization
would be jeopardized.
Because divestiture inevitably mandated the development of
pricing based on marginal costs, it was anticipated that local
service pricing would increase, while long-distance prices
would fall, with both moving in the direction of marginal
costs. 244 Thereby, the economists told us, allocative efficiency
would be achieved.
However, the political problems were formidable. Raising
residential prices overnight would have produced a tremen-
dous "rate shock," and created political backlash against di-
vestiture and deregulation.245 If the local telephone monopoly
became totally deregulated, local residents could expect to pay
whatever the market would bear.
Additional political problems existed in rural America.
Rate averaging made it possible to set local and long-distance
rates in many rural communities at levels comparable to those
enjoyed in urban areas, even though the cost of providing ser-
vice to rural communities was substantially higher.
But marginal cost pricing inevitably requires that residential
service be weaned from the long-distance subsidy. How might
that best be accomplished? The FCC envisioned a transition
period in which access charges would be imposed on both long-
distance companies and local residential users. In the early
years, most of the revenue would come from long-distance car-
246rier access charges, which would gradually fall as user ac-
243. CREW & KLEINDORFER, supra note 139, at 211, 215.
244. MacAvoy & Robinson, supra note 29, at 226-35.
245. For example, in Colorado, the local telephone residential rate was about $9
per month. If this price was to cover the incremental costs of local access and usage,
rates would have to be raised to $21 per month, and if it was to cover average embed-
ded costs, rates would then climb to $32 per month. Glesne, supra note 167, at 83.
246. These charges were formally called "carrier common line charges." 48 Fed.
Reg. 10337 (Mar. 11, 1983). AT&T was required to pay a "premium access charge" to
offset the competitive advantage it had in the quality of interconnection as compared
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cess charges2 47 correspondingly increased. The resulting
revenues would partially make up the residential rate
shortfall. Thus, the non-traffic-sensitive costs that were allo-
cated to interstate service would gradually be recovered
through an end-user charge.
In December 1982, the FCC adopted a five-year transition
plan, the objectives of which were to eliminate discriminatory
preferences, promote efficient utilization of the network, dis-
courage uneconomic bypass, and insure universal service.248
The transition was to proceed as follows:
Year Carrier Contribution End-User Contribution
1984 100% 0%
1985 80% 20%
1986 60% 40%
1987 40% 60%
1988 20% 80%
1989 0% 100%
The Commission reasoned that this method of collection
would assure that costs would be paid by' the cost-causative
ratepayer. 49 Initially, the FCC envisioned that residential
customers would eventually pay a $7 fee. Revised fees were
announced in September 1983: residential access charges
would be $2 in 1984, $3 in 1985, and $4 in 1986. The access
charges for business would be $6.250 Consumers would enjoy
corresponding reductions in long-distance charges as the ac-
cess fees of carriers were reduced.
Critics objected to the FCC's proposal on grounds that such
sharp increases in residential charges would cause the poor to
drop off the system and would thereby jeopardize universal
service. Many members of Congress asked the FCC to delay
the proposed increases for residential users.
The FCC responded by reducing the residential and single
with the local exchanges. This premium charge was reduced, as equal quality access
became available to all the long-distance carriers, from 35% in 1984, to 23% in 1985,
to 12% for the first six months of 1986, and zero thereafter. 49 Fed. Reg. 940 (Jan. 5,
1985).
247. This charge is formally called a "subscriber line charge," or "customer access
line charge."
248. 48 Fed. Reg. 10321 (Mar. 11, 1983).
249. Id. at 10334.
250. 48 Fed. Reg. 42989 (Sept. 21, 1984).
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line charge to $1, increasing it to $2 in 1986.251 More recently,
a joint board comprised of state PUC and FCC Commissioners
agreed that the subscriber line charge would be frozen once it
reached $3.50 in December 1988.252
In addition to these FCC mandated user access charges, in
nearly every state the price of basic residential service has in-
creased since divestiture, although sources differ as to the ex-
tent of the increase. One indicates that between 1984 and
1987, local phone rates rose an average of 45%, while long-dis-
tance rates dropped about 30%.253 Another estimated that lo-
cal telephone rates have risen between 35% and 52% since
divestiture, an aggregate increase of more than $5 billion.254
Some local rates have jumped more than 100%.255
The Consumer Federation of America's (CFA) findings on
the results of divestiture were even worse. Relying on data
compiled by the Bureau of Labor Statistics, the CFA esti-
mated in late 1986 that long-distance rates had fallen only 17%
since divestiture, while local rates had increased 40%, and in-
trastate long-distance rates had increased 4%. The bottom line
is that the typical consumer is paying rates of about 20% more
than she paid prior to the breakup of AT&T.256
Telephone customers are experiencing a decline in long-dis-
tance rates, although, as we have seen, these decreases have in
large part been stimulated by declining carrier access charges
(and correspondingly increasing residential access charges).257
251. 50 Fed. Reg. 940 (Jan. 5, 1985).
252. Megdal, supra note 134.
253. See Keller, Seghers, Foust & King, The Long Distance Wars Get Hotter, Bus.
WK., March 23, 1987, at 150-52; see also Keller, Seghers & Ivey, AT&T is Eating 'Em
Alive, Bus. WK., Feb. 16, 1987, at 28, 29; MCI's Fight Over a Future in the World It
Helped to Create, Bus. WK., May 25, 1987, at 114. The bulk of the 30% drop in
AT&T's long-distance rates resulted from reduced connection costs. Guyon, AT&T
Asks FCC to End Regulation Limiting Its Profit, Wall St. J., March 9, 1987, at 18;
Schwadel, supra note 199.
254. Spievack, supra note 131, at 14.
255. Phone Mess, supra note 241, at 24.
256. Davis, Phone Rates Said to Rise 20%, Wall St. J., Dec. 30, 1986, at 6. More
recently, CFA representative Gene Kimmelman has acknowledged that while long-
distance rates have declined by about one-third since divestiture, local residential
rates have increased by approximately 60%. 5 Years After AT&T Breakup, Opinion
Divided On Benefits, Denver Post, Dec. 11, 1988, at 2B.
257. The FCC ordered AT&T to slash interstate long-distance rates 11% annually
and to reduce its WATS rates 5%, effective January 1, 1987. AT&T's competitors
regularly try to match AT&T's price reductions for fear of losing customers, so MCI
and Sprint were expected to reduce their rates, too. The FCC ordered the price
reductions to force AT&T to pass along to its customers savings from lower pay-
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But while heavy toll users enjoy lower overall telephone bills,
the numerically larger class of consumers pay more. Note the
distributional effects of these wealth transfers: heavy toll
users, who are generally a wealthier class of individuals, have
benefitted, while those who rely mostly on residential service,
generally a poorer class of consumers, pay higher rates.
These sharp local rate increases are being imposed even in
the face of higher profits. Because local telephone service ex-
ists as a monopoly in virtually all communities, local tele-
phone companies face far less risk than competitive
companies. Consequently, one would expect the competitive
companies to have lower rates of return. Before divestiture,
AT&T consistently earned 1% to 2% less than other large cor-
porations.25 But since divestiture, the RBOCs have earned 2%
to 3% more.25 9 Not only have earnings increased since divesti-
ture, the RBOCs have also declared dividends of about twice
the national average rate.260  Hence, RBOC stockholders have
realized significant benefits in terms of equity appreciation
and increased dividends. Again, note the regressive nature of
the wealth transfer from consumers to producers.
One consequence of higher local rates is declining numbers
of telephone connections among virtually all income groups,
and thus, an adverse impact upon universal service.261 The ad-
ments to local phone companies for connections. The largest cuts were to be made
in night and weekend rates, with residential customers receiving most of the benefit.
See Davis, supra note 197. See also An FCC Call Brings Lower Phone Rates, Bus.
WK., Jan. 12, 1987, at 50. AT&T filed a proposed average rate reduction of 3.6% on
the long-distance service, to begin January 1, 1988, reflecting proposed reductions in
connection fees to local phone companies. AT&T proposed that regular long-dis-
tance rates be cut by 6.3% during the day, but by only 2.2% during the evening and
.8% during the night and on weekends. Guyon, AT&T Proposed $800 Million Rate
Cut in Rush for Reduced Local-Linkup Costs, Wall St. J., Nov. 18, 1987, at 2, col. 3.
258. Kahn, Utility Regulation Revisited, in CURRENT ISSUES IN PUBLIC UTILITY
ECONOMICS (Danielsen & Kamerschen eds. 1983).
259. CONSUMER FEDERATION OF AMERICA, DIVESTITURE PLUS FOUR: TAKE THE
MONEY AND RUN 3 (1987) [hereinafter CONSUMER REPORT ON DIVESTITURE].
260. Id. at 4-5.
261. Since the divestiture order, households at every income level, save one,
are less likely to have a telephone in their home or dwelling, according to
the most recent census data. For example, in November, 1983, 71.7% of
households with incomes below $5,000 had a telephone, but by March, 1986,
the saturation had dropped to 71.1%. For households with incomes between
$17,500 and $19,999, the saturation dropped from 95.7% to 94.6%. For all
households with incomes below $20,000, telephone ownership dropped from
87.8% to 87.1%. For all 14 income levels, except that from $50,000 to $74,999,
the saturation or ownership of telephones dropped among households.
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verse effects of disconnections of the poor have been some-
what ameliorated by federal and state "lifeline rate" plans.
Hence, the results would be worse if these regulatory welfare
programs did not exist.
The price charged consumers for installing and repairing
equipment soared, by as much as tenfold in some areas.262 In
Denver, installation costs are $60, even when the consumer
plugs his telephone into an existing outlet and the phone com-
pany does nothing more than throw a switch.263 College stu-
dents, many of whom move once a year or more, pay these
connection costs several times. Undoubtedly, heaping fixed
costs on a politically weak transient population meets the least
resistance, but it appears unfair to those who must pay them.
At the beginning of 1987, local telephone companies trans-
ferred ownership of "inside wire," the concealed wiring in
homes and offices that connects the telephone outlets to
outside telephone lines, to customers.264 Since deregulation,
some companies have sharply increased their maintenance
fees.265 Service contracts are now available to consumers to
take care of "inside wire" problems, a service previously pro-
vided for no additional charge beyond the low monthly fee for
telephone service.266 The immediate reaction was substantial
consumer dissatisfaction over service quality and conven-
ience.267 A representative of Consumers Union criticized the
deregulation of inside wires as "another way for the company
to get at the consumers' pocketbooks with the consumer get-
ting little benefit. '268
Consumer groups are concerned that the inevitable rise in
basic local service rates will exclude lower income families
Sterzinger, Telephone Ownership Since Divestiture, PUB. UTIL. FORT., Oct. 2, 1986, at
25, 26.
262. S. COLL, supra note 17, at 366.
263. US West residential installation charge as of January 1, 1989.
264. Some, such as Mountain Bell, began billing all customers (except those who
formally protested) a monthly service charge for inside Wire maintenance.
265. For example, Southwestern Bell Corp. in Texas charged about $59.75 per
hour to repair broken inside wire. Within a few months, the charge was $92 per
hour. Installation that cost $71.70 per hour, in just a few months, was increased to
$83 per hour. Roberts, Phone Owners Face Dilemma of 'Inside Wire,' Wall St. J.,
Apr. 8, 1987, at 31.
266. Service contracts themselves constitute additional costs to consumers.
267. Hillman, Telecommunications Deregulation: The Martyrdom of the Regu-
lated Monopolist, 79 Nw. U.L. REV., 1183, 1233, n.221 (1985).
268. Roberts, supra note 265.
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from the system. Some commentators have argued that the
optimal price for basic local service is below marginal cost, and
thus cross-subsidization should be continued despite the
breakup of the Bell System. 69 This argument is premised not
only on a social welfare rationale, but on an economic one as
well. It seems that there are external benefits from having
access to the entire population. Businesses, implicitly recog-
nizing this externality, invest in Yellow Pages to tap this vast
market of consumers. Business telephone profits, it is argued,
should cross-subsidize local residential losses in an amount
equal to this benefit.27 ° In the same way that a newspaper
purchaser pays well below the marginal cost of the newspa-
per's production because of the commercial advertising cross-
subsidy, so too should business telephone users cross-subsidize
local residential service. Others maintain that the consumer
who creates the cost ought to bear its burden, and that if soci-
ety desires to provide basic local service to those who cannot
afford it, a governmental subsidy is more economically effi-
cient than cross-subsidization.2
As of January 1987, more than 80% of phone customers in
the United States enjoyed flat rate service, entitling them to
unlimited local calling for a set monthly price.272 Economists,
however, assert that distortions to economic efficiency exist
where flat-rate pricing is the rule because under flat-rate pric-
ing, profligate usage costs the consumer nothing, even though
there is some cost to provide the service.273 Moreover, as
noted above, the cost of providing local service has risen faster
than the rates charged for the service.274
Consumer and congressional reaction against increases in lo-
cal service rates275 may have done little to thwart the inevita-
269. Stanley, High Basic Service Rates and Connection Charges: Wrong for the
Telephone Industry, PUB. UTIL. FORT., July 5, 1984, at 23.
270. See Perl, Telephone Pricing Policy-Economic Perspective, in MOUNTAIN BELL
ACADEMIC SEMINAR 113 (1986).
271. Kahn, The Road to More Intelligent Telephone Pricing, 1 YALE J. REG. 139
(1984).
272. While most American residential customers pay a flat monthly fee for local
service, in some cities, such as New York and Chicago, they pay by the call. Under
local measured service (LMS) pricing, consumers who use the local system pay
more, as they do for long-distance.
273. J. WENDERS, supra note 138, at 3-6.
274. MacAvoy & Robinson, supra note 29, at 228-30.
275. Id. at 226, 241; CREW & KLEINDORFER, supra note 139, at 215; J. WENDERS,
supra note 138, at 6.
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ble increases, but it has slowed plans for local measured
service (LMS). Under LMS, the charge for local calls is based
on the number of calls placed as well as their time, duration,
and distance.
Opposition to LMS has been intense, especially among the
elderly and small businessmen on the grounds that the burden
would be shifted to users least able to afford it. Because tele-
phone equipment for the networks is mostly comprised of
fixed costs, it has been argued that making calls over the net-
works already in place imposes no significant variable costs, at
least where system capacity is abundant. It is like walking
through a revolving door; it costs no more to have one or a
thousand people walk through the door. 6 Moreover, rate in-
creases in a regime of local measured service are politically
easier to implement by telephone companies. Because real
prices are obfuscated in a complicated rate structure, it be-
comes more difficult for the consumer to tell what a rate in-
crease will do to her telephone bill. Stiff political opposition
has led several states to drop plans for local measured
service.277
B. Tragedy on Main Street: Small Towns and Rural
Communities
Deregulation also affected rural telephone bills as telephone
companies passed on more of the actual service cost to their
customers. In the past, federal regulation supported rural sub-
sidies. Under rate-averaging requirements, the FCC required
telephone companies to charge urban and rural customers the
same for service, despite the fact that fewer customers were
276. Nonetheless, a number of economists support the institution of local mea-
sured service, on grounds that "[e]conomic theory suggests that there will be sub-
stantial gains in economic efficiency from cost-based pricing." Levin & Case, Local
Measured Service Advantages and Implementation, TELECOMMUNICATIONS POL'Y,
Mar. 1988, at 27.
277. In at least one state, local measured service appears to have decreased base
rates. Louise McCorren, Chairman of the Vermont Public Service Board, claims
that customers, as of January 1987, could get a phone line for a base fee of $10.93.
Without local measured service, customers would be paying a flat rate of $18.18
monthly. Also, a study released in November 1986 by the Center for Rural Studies
at the University of Vermont found that 63% of all households pay less under mea-
sured service than under flat rates. Roberts, Phone Companies Draw Fire by Seek-
ing to Base Local Phone Charges on Usage, Wall St. J., Jan. 6, 1987, at 31. In the
November 1986 elections, voters in both Maine and Oregon overwhelmingly passed
ballot initiatives banning mandatory charge-per-call local telephone service.
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available to cover fixed costs.2 78 The policy of universal ser-
vice implicitly recognized the social and economic externalities
of communications service. Adequate telecommunications
services at a reasonable price are essential for economic
growth. As this author has elsewhere noted, "In order for the
vast rural areas of this nation to have a healthy economy,
small towns miust have non-discriminatory access to the infra-
structure industries, or they will be isolated from the main-
stream of commerce, and wither on the vine. "279
Thus far, the telephone industry has escaped the fate of
large-scale service termination, as was experienced in the
transportation and banking industries. 280  Since divestiture,
however, rural telephone bills have increased. 28 ' The process
of deregulation could hasten depopulation of rural areas and
further the congestion of urban areas because of the greater
availability and lower costs of essential services in urban
areas.
282
The technology revolution also seems to be skirting past ru-
ral America.28 3 Small towns may never be strung to the na-
278. See supra text accompanying notes 25-31.
279. Dempsey, The Dark Side of Deregulation: Its Impact On Small Communi-
ties, 39 ADMIN. L. REV. 445, 463 (1987).
280. Letter from Michael E. Brunner to Editor, Wall St., J., Oct. 22, 1987, at 39,
col. 1 (discussing rural impact of deregulation).
281. For example, Nebraska's Water Commissioner, Mary McGinnis, said, "Can
you believe it? The bill on that old, el cheapo, dial telephone of mine-it went up
nearly 300% since 1984-from $7 a month to $27." Richards, Country Blues, Deregu-
lation Raises Prices, Cuts Services in Many Rural Areas, Wall St. J., Oct. 5, 1987, at
1, col. 1.
282. Id.
283. [R]ural America currently does not have and may not be getting the
technical information structure required for full participation in the Infor-
mation Age. A recent study in Washington [State] indicated that selected
telecommunications services, quality service, and other information technol-
ogies were less prevalent in rural cities and the rural countryside surround-
ing them than they were in urban areas. For example . .. only 76% of the
households in rural locales had one party (private) telephone service com-
pared to 93 to 97% in all other locations. Both rural cities and the country-
side are also distinctly less likely to have touch tone, call waiting, and
telephone answering machines. In addition there is a slight tendency for
rural households to report poor quality of service, and for calls to the com-
munity they most depend upon for services to require toll charges ....
Nationwide, one party telephone service is available to all households in
only 82% of our 45,746 rural communities. This availability ranges from
74% in the Western United States to 91% in the Northeast. Digital switch-
ing, a key requirement for data transmission by telephone, is a part of the
phone service to only 44% of our rural communities nationwide ....
The data from Washington State suggest that the availability of informa-
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tional fiber optics system, because technology is not efficient
in areas with low demand for long-distance. Moreover, the
competitive services of long-distance carriers other than
AT&T are unavailable in most small towns. So, whatever ben-
efits urban regions of the nation may enjoy in terms of new
technology and increased competition, these benefits appear
not to be trickling down to the rural regions of the nation.284
Other critics of deregulation include small, independent tel-
ephone companies. They fear that larger companies will move
into their territories and engage in "cream skimming," taking
the small companies' most lucrative customers, while leaving
them with the unprofitable service to rural areas.8 5
C. A Cornucopia of Technological Innovation, Equipment, and
Services
One of the major benefits resulting from divestiture and
partial deregulation is the wide diversity of equipment, tech-
nology, and service now available to customers.2 86 Before di-
tion technologies is coming to rural communities at a slower pace than to
urban areas. The nationwide data make it clear that private lines and digi-
tal switching, essential elements for computer to computer communication,
is coming slowly to rural areas.
Dillman & Beck, Information Technologies and Rural Development in the 1990s 19,
23 (unpublished paper 1987).
284. Many of the rural areas of the Rocky Mountain west still are equipped with
pre-World War II telephone equipment. The telephone companies serving them can-
not justify upgrading the equipment and service because of the slim revenues they
generate. Rural Phone Problems Persist, Denver Post, Aug. 21, 1988, at 9B, col. 1.
Silverton [Colorado] residents say they can accept that a utility would not
want to spend a lot of money for a small population, but they don't under-
stand a lack of patchup on the existing system.
This year, US West laid off the repairman who had taken care of
Silverton's problems for years. Fred Wolfe was replaced by a phone com-
pany promise that a Ouray repairman would be available.
"The phone company promises now if it goes out it will be fixed by 5
o'clock the following day. Fred used to fix it in 10 minutes," said Silverton
hotel owner Bill Staat.
But as businessman Bill Howell said, 'This is antique equipment. You
have to kick it every once in a while. I mean literally kick it every once in a
while to get it going."
Id.
285. Telephone Deregulation Pits Davids Against Goliaths, Wall St. J., Oct. 17,
1986, at 6, col. 1.
286. Some of the services likely to be offered or expanded through this new com-
petitive environment include electronic mail, videotex, electronic funds transfer,
billing, video teleconferencing, and other video services. Pool, Competition and Uni-
versal Service, in DISCONNECTING BELL, THE IMPACT OF THE AT&T DIVESTITURE 112,
123-25 (H. Shooshan III ed. 1984). As of October 1987, videotex services were used by
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vestiture, the customer was largely limited to heavy-duty
Western Electric equipment primarily because of that equip-
ment's durability. Over-engineering the telephones protected
the integrity and quality of the telecommunications system.
But the monopoly deprived consumers of the full range of
price and quality options available in a free market. Today,
Adam Smith's invisible hands determine what type of tele-
phones are manufactured, and at what price. Competition also
appears to have spurred action and innovation on the part of
the three main telecommunications carriers,287 as well as other
companies in the information service business.
Consumers today can buy a Mickey Mouse telephone at
Sears or a Mickey Mouse telephone from a mail order catalog;
enjoy dial-a-porn from their cellular radio telephones in their
BMWs;2 8 and purchase services as diverse as call forwarding,
only 750,000 persons, or less than 1% of households. Less than Half a Loaf Judge
Greene Refuses to Unleash the Regional Holding Companies, PUB. UTIL. FORT., Oct.
15, 1987, at 30, 32. Services provided by videotex systems being considered or already
underway include airline schedules, physician referrals, home pizza delivery, phone
listings, tutoring of students, help-wanted ads, other advertising, headline news,
stock prices, electronic coupon clipping, and home banking. Id. at 30, 32; Davis &
Peterson, Will Minitel Play Deep in the Heart of Texas?, Bus. WK., Oct. 19, 1987, at
92.
The cellular telephone industry is expanding. Cellular phones allow users to
make calls, no matter where they are, through radio waves instead of conventional
wires. Users, most commonly callers who do a lot of traveling or need constant ac-
cessibility, such as sales representatives or doctors, can communicate from almost
anywhere, saving, and improving productivity. Whitfield and Burkhardt, Independ-
ent Telephone Companies Have Not Ignored Cellular Technology, PUB. UTIL. FORT.,
Nov. 12, 1987, at 36.
Bell Atlantic Mobile Systems, Inc., is offering a voice-activated carphone that
stores as many as 29 phone numbers and dials them on command. It will also store
telephone numbers of people calling while the owner is away from the car. Users
will not have to take their eyes from the road. While the cost ($1595 as of January 1,
1988) prohibits use by the average consumer, it would be useful for business persons
and those looking for a new toy. New Mobile Phone Dials 20 Numbers on Com-
mand, Wall St. J., Dec. 1, 1987, at 25, col. 1.
287. The carriers have worked to improve service. MCI, Sprint, and AT&T are
all modernizing faster than planned. It appears they will all convert to advanced
voice and data transmission made possible by fiber optics and digital switching equip-
ment much sooner than earlier thought. Keller, Seghers, Foust, & King, The Long-
Distance Wars Get Hotter, Bus. WK., March 23, 1987, at 150.
For instance, AT&T plans to install up to 24,000 miles of state-of-the-art, fiber-
optic cable in its network and have it operational by 1989. (Optical glass cable offers
clearer transmission voice and data messages, a real attraction for corporate custom-
ers that move a lot of computer information over phone lines.) AT&T Gains in the
Long-Distance Runs, Bus. WK., Feb. 2, 1987, at 38.
288. Dial-a-porn has become a $300 million a year business in the United States.
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call waiting, voice mail, electronic mail, and audiotex.289 Large
businesses can send computer data across the nation in a flash.
The wider array of products and services may be considered
in either a positive 29 or a negative 291 light because the choices
are becoming more difficult. For a century, consumers have
had the convenience of one-stop shopping for nearly all tele-
phone equipment and services. However, since 1984 consum-
ers have been hard pressed to determine which company is
responsible for what services, and to make sense of their tele-
phone bills. Suddenly, either the local telephone company
could provide telephone equipment, or consumers could
purchase their own; the operating companies, however, do not
lease or repair the telephones already in homes. Repairing the
nation's embedded telephone equipment is the province of
AT&T; local operating companies repair the lines.292 Unfor-
tunately, consumers can no longer rely on the resources of a
single company to provide all telephone services.293 Conse-
quently, transaction costs for consumers and businesses have
increased significantly.
The new forefront for long-distance markets lies in techno-
logical innovations in communications line capacity. Several
major companies are spending over $6 billion installing long-
distance fiber optics 294 communications networks.295 This, in
See Miller, How Dial-a-Porn Firm Uses the Phone System To Make Fast Fortune,
Wall St. J., Aug. 5, 1988, at 1, col. 8.
289. See Amparano & Carnevale, A Dispute Slows Up the Information Age, Wall
St. J., June 21, 1988, at 6, col. 1.
290. In the past, the only option for the consumer was to lease a standard tele-
phone from AT&T. Now, the consumer has a choice "between a ten-dollar phone or
one for one hundred dollars, of any style or color, from any one of a hundred retail
outlets... 1" Greene, supra note 137, at 255.
291. As one commentator noted: "Today many consumers are still uncomfortable
about the changes and what they see as profound negatives-multipage telephone
bills, fragmented service, poor quality equipment and do-it-yourself telephoning, to
name but a few." Campbell, PUB. UTIL. FORT. Mar. 6, 1986, at 13.
292. S. COLL, supra note 17, at 366.
293. The most fundamental change is that consumers can no longer call upon the
resources of one company. The telephone industry will become more like the trans-
portation industry, with no single company offering all services. Zielinski, Regula-
tion and Public Policy After Divestiture, in DISCONNECTING BELL, THE IMPACT OF
THE AT&T DIVESTITURE 100, 100-01 (H. Shooshan III ed. 1984).
294. Fiber optic cables are thin glass fibers that can carry up to 400,000 light-
borne calls simultaneously over a single cable less than one inch thick. Their capac-
ity is up to ten times more than the existing, most sophisticated systems. Fiber op-
tics are also less expensive. Current networks cost approximately $7 per circuit
mile, while fiber optics cost only $1 per circuit mile. Costs appear to be going down;
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turn, spurred AT&T to speed up the introduction of digital
switching machines and fiber optic cables into its system.296
After divestiture, AT&T, MCI, Sprint, and others began
construction of new networks which would increase the capac-
ity of the U.S. long-distance system from 1.4 billion circuit
miles in 1985 to more than 8 billion circuit miles by 1988-a
500% increase. Once the capacity is on-line, the companies
should begin cutting prices to attract customers, likely result-
ing in a shake up similar to that which occured in the com-
puter industry.297  Fiber optics, however, may have the
characteristics of a natural monopoly. If it does, will that
mean the eventual bankruptcy of the smaller entrants into the
long-distance market?
Undoubtedly, new competition can be a catalyst for effi-
ciency and innovation in a firm's operations. As one source
predicted, "sharper competition should stimulate the growth
of new technologies and bring advanced services to market
although fiber optics cable once cost $3.00 per foot, it now costs only about 30 cents a
foot.
295. FORTUNE, Jan. 7, 1985, at 97.
296. AT&T had 10,500 route-miles of fiber optic cable in place by the end of 1986.
This was stimulated by a strong move in that direction by U.S. Sprint, which plans a
23,000-mile, fiber optic network. Guyon, AT&T to Draw Line On Its Long-Distance
Turf, Wall St. J., Nov. 21, 1986, at 5. By 1987, Sprint had spent $3 billion laying
17,000 miles of fiber optic cable, and was suffering quarterly losses of a quarter of a
billion dollars. Guyon, US Sprint Endures Some Growing Pains, Wall St. J., July 17,
1987, at 6 [hereinafter Sprint Growing Pains]. MCI had 5,500 miles of fiber optic
cable by the end of 1986, and expected to have 10,000 miles by the end of 1987.
Guyon, AT&T to Focus 1987Spending On Its Network, Wall St. J., Jan. 23, 1987, at 4.
297. Some predict that, with improved fibers and lasers, within 15 years the car-
rying capacity of fiber optics will be 1,000,000 megabites.
Even the local customer connections, the so-called "twisted pair" of two copper
wires, is experiencing technological change. Through the concept of derived chan-
nels, a single residential line can be engineered to accommodate additional devices,
such as burglar alarms or computer terminals, all operating simultaneously.
Other areas of personal communications are also rapidly expanding. A good ex-
ample is the rapid development of cellular mobile communications. Starting from
ground zero five years ago, by 1986 cellular served 29 of the top 33 metropolitan
areas and several of the smaller markets. Successful experiments have shown that
cellular can provide primary service nationwide through the use of repeater satellite
facilities. In fact, the only technological barrier remaining between the old land line
system and local networks of entirely radio-based communications is the limitation
on the expected life of the batteries powering the portable telephones.
With the advent of the silicon semiconductor revolution, switching functions are
now performed electronically. By no longer switching mechanically, costs have been
significantly reduced and the process of switching has been made more efficient.
Hence, switching, one of the core functions of telecommunications, has become rela-
tively inexpensive and more broadly accessible to competitors.
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more quickly. ' 208 The former Bell System companies were
sufficiently shaken up by divestiture and deregulation to join
the ranks of aggressive modern corporations, trim labor costs
and expand productivity,299 to develop emerging technology to
meet the competitive threat quickly.
But AT&T has always been on the cutting edge of technol-
ogy. Ironically, that tradition may be jeopardized by divesti-
ture. It was Bell Labs, a national resource of long-term
research and development (R&D), upon which the regulatory
structure enabled AT&T to lavish enormous resources. Bell
Labs provided the fundamental research for the development
of the transistor, microwave, and satellite communications,
those genies whose escape from the bottle made possible the
competitive threat of MCI and Sprint.A00 Perhaps fiber optics
did not come off the shelf as quickly as it might have without
the entry of MCI and Sprint, but capacity had not yet reached
a level to warrant the replacement of the Bell System's ex-
isting long lines. MCI and Sprint, building new systems from
scratch, undoubtedly would opt for the most advanced tech-
nology available-fiber optics. AT&T, not wanting to be left
behind, followed suit by stringing its own fiber optics system.
But even without the catalyst of competitive entry, as data
flows demanded it, we might well have seen AT&T gradually
string the country with fiber optics, even absent the competi-
tive stimulant of new entry, as its existing long lines needed
replacement or capacity needed expansion.
Some have recognized the existence of greater economies of
scale in long-distance communications than in the industry as
a whole.f0 ' If long-distance is a natural monopoly, we may
eventually see the bankruptcy of many of the smaller firms
which today enjoy-a relatively small share of the market vis-a-
vis AT&T. Since fiber optics lines have nearly infinite capac-
ity, it is a wasteful commitment of society's resources to spend
several billion dollars laying parallel lines, each with unused
298. Did It Make Sense to Break Up AT&T?, Bus. WK., Dec. 3, 1984, at 86.
299. Since divestiture, AT&T has trimmed its labor force by more than 17% and
slashed expenses by more than $1 billion. As Profit Lags, AT&T Eases Computer
Push, Plans Further Job Cuts, Wall St. J., Nov. 11, 1986, at 1, col. 6.
300. W. TURNSTALL, supra note 40, at 4.
301. J. MEYER, R. WILSON, M. BAUGHCUM, E. BURTON & L. CAOUETTE, THE Eco-
NOMICS OF COMPETITION IN THE TELECOMMUNICATIONS INDUSTRY 147 (1980) [herein-
after J. MEYER].
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capacity.0 2
Moreover, there is a real question as to whether Bell Labs,
that great national treasure which launched a thousand ideas
to help propel America to the center of the technological
revolution, will continue to enjoy the economic support it has
traditionally received when its parent is fighting for market
share in a social Darwinist scramble for survival. American
industry, with an eye on quarterly profits, has been widely,
and rightly criticized for devoting inadequate resources to
long-term R&D. Our nation's largest research laboratory may
be jeopardized by the competitive siege as the former Bell Sys-
tem companies pursue the primordial imperative of American
corporate enterprise-quarterly profits. 3
There is also the question of whether hooking up all those
non-Bell Mickey Mouse telephones and systems to the net-
work has caused quality to suffer. Furthermore, there is some
cause for concern that the Baby Bells are so interested in di-
versification that they are devoting less resources to service,
research, and development, ignoring the goose that lays the
golden egg.
Prior to 1984, America had the finest quality telecommuni-
cations system in the world. Before divestiture, "the concept
of public interest involved above all the twin goals of univer-
sal availability and superior quality. [The regulated 1Bell Sys-
tem] advanced these goals and ... their essential corollaries-
service reliability, network efficiency, technological excel-
lence, [and] affordable prices .... ,,304 But for many users, the
system has since degenerated. Some feel that quality has suf-
fered to such an extent that placing a call today in the U.S. is
302. One commentator recently criticized this wasteful duplication of communica-
tions infrastructure stimulated by new competition:
Today we have a multiplicity of parallel facilities . . .provided by the vari-
ous vendors permitted by competition. We cannot see this "clutter" because
modern intercity facilities are largely underground in fiber or coaxial cable,
or they travel invisibly as microwave radio beams or via satellite. If we
could actually see all this proliferation of unnecessarily duplicated plant,
the economic costs would be obvious and public outcry would demand an
explanation.
Duerig, The Demise of the Telephone Network, PUB. UTIL. FORT., Jan. 23, 1986, at 32.
303. See J. MEYER, supra note 301, at 190. Did It Make Sense to Break Up AT&T?,
Bus. WK., Dec. 3, 1984, at 88. The United States spends less as a percentage of its
gross national product (1.86%) on non-defense research than do Japan (2.75%) and
West Germany (2.53%). McCartney, U.S. Cripples Itself Paying Rich Allies' Defense
Bills, Denver Post, Dec. 11, 1988, at H1, col. 2.
304. W. TURNSTALL, supra note 40, at 3 (emphasis in original).
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like placing a call in a third world nation, with noise, discon-
nections, and misconnections becoming more common.30 5
D. Industry Instability: Riding the Roller Coaster
With the advent of deregulation, competition has en-
couraged companies to expand into risky markets and to incur
sizeable losses.3"6 Once released from the shackles of the 1956
Consent Decree, AT&T's foray into the computer market was
a multi-billion dollar disaster. 7 Many of the RBOCs suffered
similar catastrophes from the non-communications ventures
into which they leapt.08 Dozens of the estimated 520 regional
and national long-distance carriers and resellers are teetering
on the edge of bankruptcy, and today only three long-distance
carriers have significant market shares.30 9 Evidence is mount-
ing that a striking increase in concentration is occurring in the
305. See Rosenblum, supra note 146, at 108.
306. Substantial numbers of the hundreds of new businesses spawned by deregu-
lation are discovering an over-supplied market and miserable profit margins. Keller,
As The Big Get Bigger, The Small May Disappear, Bus. WK., Jan. 12, 1987, at 90.
307. Guyon, AT&T Sets News Confierence to Bolster Its Credibility in The Com-
puter Industry, Wall St. J., Mar. 20, 1987, at 15, col. 3; Why AT&T Isn't Clicking,
Bus. WK., May 19, 1986, at 88; The Progress of AT&T in Computer Business Proves
Disappointing, Wall St. J., May 12, 1986, at 1, col. 1.
308. Roberts, Baby Bells Diversify Into Non-Phone Areas, Spark Much Criticism,
Wall St. J., Dec. 10, 1986, at 1, col. 1. Some have criticized these investments as
cross-subsidized by telephone rate payers. Id. "The truth is that diversification, par-
ticularly as implemented by the regional Bell operating companies (RBOCs), drains
residential rate revenues to fuel ill-conceived acquisition schemes and risky competi-
tive ventures." Spievack, supra note 131, at 13. "The telephone companies have
made money on their bread-and-butter, monopoly exchange service, but have lost
substantial sums in unregulated, competitive markets." Id. at 14. See also U.S. West:
A Trailblazer That's Getting Left Behind, Bus. WK., June 6, 1988, at 134; Keller,
Seghers, Foust, & King, The Long Distance Wars Get Hotter, Bus. WK., Mar. 23,
1987, at 150. At first, computer stores looked like a tremendous opportunity to the
deregulated regional Bell phone companies. Now, those ventures may have been an
expensive lesson in free enterprise. For instance, Bell Atlantic Corporation is clos-
ing 24 of its 40 CompuShop, Inc. stores after shutting 27 stores in 1986 and laying off
30% of its computer sales force. PCs and Phone Companies Aren't An Ideal Couple
After All, Bus. WK., Oct. 12, 1987, at 166c. In 1986, MCI had a $448 million loss.
MCI's Fight For a Future in The World It Helped Create, Bus. WK., May 25, 1987, at
114. AT&T posted an operating loss of $800 million on its computer business in 1986,
as well as operating losses of $500 million at its phone switch business and $250 mil-
lion at its micro-electronics unit. Keller, Lewis, Maremont, & Symonds, AT&T May
Be Ready to Cut Its Losses in Computers, Bus. WK., July 6, 1987, at 30.
309. As of 1987, the market shares of companies providing service between local
calling areas was AT&T (72%), MCI (9.3%), U.S. Sprint (5.6%), and others (13.1%).
Long Distance Rivals Battle Over Big Business, Rocky Mtn. News, July 26, 1988, at
6B [hereinafter Long Distance Rivals].
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deregulated industries."' 0 The ultimate impact on the con-
sumer could very well be ascending prices and declining
service.311
After divestiture, the FCC mandated two years of balloting
in which consumers were allowed to select which long-dis-
tance carrier they wished to serve them.3 12 Nearly 500 compa-
nies competed in the "equal access" balloting of some fifty-six
million business and residential customers, which was con-
cluded on September 1, 1986. AT&T was the clear winner,
with approximately 75% of the customers' vote; MCI was a
distant second, with 8%; Sprint was third, with about 4% of
the vote. 13
More recent estimates suggest that AT&T continues to en-
joy a 70-80% interstate market share. 14 Excluding the intra-
state toll market,1 5 the following table illustrates AT&T's
dominance, of which the Wall Street Journal stated:
[O]ne of the biggest disappointments of the Bell System
breakup has been the failure of competitors to create enough
310. Is Deregulation Working?, Bus. WK., Dec. 22, 1986, at 50.
After the FCC began opening the interexchange market to competition in
the 1970s, hundreds of companies rushed in and some observers predicted
that AT&T's market share would shrink to 60% or less. Yet . . .AT&T
retains a huge 82% share. Only two companies, MCI and U.S. Sprint Com-
munications Co., have more than 1%. AT&T still enjoys a virtual monopoly
in the huge toll-free, big business, and overseas markets. Analyst Fritz
Ringling . . .believes that AT&T will become a "deregulated monopoly"
that will, in effect, set prices and whose competitors "will exist orly at
AT&T's good graces because it doesn't want another antitrust suit. Compe-
tition as the FCC envisioned it hasn't worked.
Id. at 52.
311. For example, deregulation permitted all types of companies to try telephone-
directory publishing. General Telephone Company of the Southwest, a unit of GTE
Corporation, increased the listing price for residential customers from 15 to 50 cents
per name and announced it will no longer supply local publishers with monthly up-
dates. Phone Directories: Making Life Harder for the Little Guys, Bus. WK., June 1,
1987, at 82F.
312. Calling Long Distance: User Vote Shows Strong Support for AT&T, Wall St.
J., Aug. 22, 1986, at 19, col. 4. Customers who failed to vote were assigned a carrier
depending on the outcome in their region.
313. Id.
314. AT&T Profits, supra note 207; Schwadel, supra note 199. As of 1987, the
market shares of companies providing service between local calling areas were:
AT&T (72%), MCI (9.3%), U.S. Sprint (5.6%), and other (13.1%). Long Distance Ri-
vals, supra note 309. MCI was beginning to make inroads into corporate accounts
and worldwide direct dialing-traditional AT&T strongholds. Id.
315. If we add in the intrastate toll markets, in which, in most states, the long-
distance carriers may not lawfully compete, AT&T's dominance does not appear
quite so overwhelming:
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price competition to make big inroads into AT&T's market
position. AT&T executives themselves have said publicly that
a competition in the industry is still nascent. Most chilling
are observations by analysts that the market might be a natu-
ral monopoly after all.31 6
Interstate Market Shares317
Carrier 1985 1988*
AT&T 82.0% 74.5%
MCI 7.0% 11.0%.
Sprint 4.0% 6.0%
Others 7.0% 6.0%
* projected 3 18
Sprint's recent losses have caused some concern among in-
dustry executives that GTE will bail out 319 and allow Sprint to
go bankrupt 2 ° It has been suggested that a market share of
at least 10% is required to sustain long-term viability in the
interexchange markets, a target that MCI has barely achieved,
and to which Sprint is not even close.2 One MCI executive
noted that an MCI failure "would re-raise questions about
whether this is a competitive or monopoly industry."3 2
Sprint, however, received a reprieve in December 1988 when it
and AT&T were awarded a $25 billion contract to rebuild the
Long-Distance Market Share 1985 1986* 1987*
AT&T 67.8% 65.3% 63.4%
MCI 5.3 6.6 7.9
U.S. Sprint 2.9 3.8 • 4.5
Baby Bells (intrastate) 14.1 13.6 13.0
Other 9.9 10.7 11.0
Total (in billions $) $56.5 $61.67 $66.69
* Estimate
Wall St. J., June 25, 1987, at 6.
316. AT&T Lift, supra note 194.
317. Denver Post, Dec. 11, 1988, at 2G, col. 4.
318. Id.
319. Between July 1986 and July 1988, U.S. Sprint losses totaled $1.76 billion.
Long Distance Rivals, supra note 309.
320. GTE's sale of its stock to United Telcom leaves GTE with less than 20% of
Sprint's stock. McCarthy, United Telcom's Esrey Is Betting Company's Future on
Long Distance, Wall St. J., July 20, 1988, at 27, col. 1.
321. See Trebing, Apologetics of Deregulation in Energy and Telecommunica-
tions: An Institutionalist Assessment, 20 J. ECON. ISSUES 613, 620 (1986).
322. Sprint Growing Pains, supra note 296.
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federal government's telecommunications system.323
E. The Natural Monopoly Question Revisited
Sources differ as to whether there is a natural monopoly in
telecommunications. Some argue that it was the regulatory
environment itself that established the monopoly. As the tele-
phone industry developed, public policies were implemented
through legislation and regulatory decisions which provided
the environment for a monopoly to emerge.: Between 1893 and
1910, the semi-competitive market structure was replaced with
a regulated monopoly.
In addition to rationales of avoiding duplicative, wasteful in-
vestment, the cost advantage of exchange and interexchange
services may indicate intrinsic natural monopolies. Every tele-
phone in every exchange must be able to call and be called by
every other telephone in that exchange and in every other ex-
change. To do that they must share a common switch or
switches. Because maximum interconnectivity was the goal,
telecommunications was accorded monopoly status.324
With the advent of new technology, however, microwave
and satellite communications became viable alternatives to the
twisted pair of copper wires which had previously dominated
voice transmissions. Technology thus served as a catalyst for
competitive services.
The FCC treated telecommunications as a natural monopoly
until the 1960s, when it permitted competition in specialized
networks providing distinct technical services different from
the standard services provided by AT&T. 25 The difficulty was
in identifying categories of services that ought to be provided
by a regulated monopoly, and differentiating those services
from services that ought to be open to competitors.326 The
FCC eventually abandoned the idea of a well-defined fixed do-
main of "monopoly" service, and attempted to establish a pro-
cess whereby the marketplace itself would decide which
markets would be monopolized and which would be
competitive.327
323. Divestiture's Pyre, supra note 7, at 10.
324. W. TURNSTALL, supra note 40, at 5-6.
325. Noll, The Future of Telecommunications Regulation, in TELECOMMUNICA-
TIONS REGULATION TODAY AND TOMORROW 43-44 (E. Noam ed. 1983).
326. Id. at 44.
327. Id.
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In its defense to the Department of Justice's antitrust suit,
AT&T maintained that the toll network was a natural mono-
poly. It argued that reserving the toll market for a single sup-
plier would allow the realization of economies of scale, and
result in improved economic welfare. Free from regulation,
however, AT&T could set long-distance prices so low that it
would drive the competition out of business. So why disman-
tle the company and the regulatory structure, when the net
result would be an eventual return to monopoly? 328 Others al-
leged that the economic performance of the toll markets could
be enhanced under unprotected and unregulated monopoly,
and that only the market process allows competition to deter-
mine where a natural monopoly exists.329
Even the godfather of deregulation, Alfred Kahn, has ex-
pressed serious reservations as to whether competition in this
industry is a long- or short-term phenomenon:
[W]e simply do not know whether large parts of the busi-
ness may really be natural monopolies.... [I]t is by no means
clear to what extent the competition now prevailing in the
long-distance business is merely the result of the artificial
pricing and other handicaps still imposed on AT&T and its
successor companies. The same uncertainty extends to the
competitive bypassing of the local telephone companies and
the competitive provision of the equivalent of local service by
geographically concentrated business users, such as in the
shared tenant services provided in "smart buildings."
330
The artificial regulatory constraints imposed upon AT&T,
referred to by Kahn, stem from the fact that it is the only
carrier effectively regulated by the FCC.3 3 ' Higher access
charges were initially imposed upon it.3 32 AT&T has, until re-
cently, been prohibited from de-averaging rates-cutting a
deal with a large company to keep it on its system. 3  The two
other major companies, MCI and Sprint, have been freer to
engage in discriminatory pricing, raiding AT&T's largest cus-
tomers with sweet deals.33 4 While MCI and Sprint's market
328. Decision to Divest, supra note 28, at 55.
329. J. WENDERS, supra note 138, at 216-17.
330. Kahn & Shew, Current Issues in Telecommunications Regulation: Pricing, 4
YALE J. REG. 191 (1987).
331. Divestiture's Pyre, supra note 7, at 9.
332. AT&T Lift, supra note 194.
333. Divestiture's Pyre, supra note 7.
334. Robinson-Patman Act prohibitions against pricing discrimination do not ap-
ply to the sale of services, so if the FCC allows discriminatory pricing, it is legal.
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share has grown because of this, one wonders what their share
of the long-distance pie will be now that AT&T is allowed to
meet those prices under the rate cap incentive pricing regula-
tion recently adopted by the FCC.33 5
While reasonable people still disagree as to whether long-
distance is a natural monopoly, there seems to be greater
agreement that local service is a natural monopoly. Four
years after divestiture, the local companies remain actual mo-
nopolies, and the services they provide are not likely to be-
come competitive in the near future. The conditions that
caused these monopolies to emerge in the first place-the capi-
tal resources required to connect local consumers to central
office switches throughout the nation's urban and rural ar-
eas-preclude duplication of the local network. 36 There ap-
pear to be economies of scale and scope, economies of density,
and economic barriers to entry in the local market. It is not
really the technology that creates the bottleneck; it is the
large capital costs of laying a new system, coupled with the
likelihood of political opposition to a new firm's proposal to
tear up the streets.
The day may come when less costly and obtrusive technol-
ogy can provide a viable alternative to the residential tele-
phone system.337 But for now, at least, those competitive
alternatives are not readily available.3
335. One would imagine that AT&T might muscle into their markets, but not so
as to obliterate its smaller rivals, for nothing, it seems, so raises the wrath of our
government. It would instead dominate the market, leaving a few "niches" for MCI
or Sprint to fill in order to sustain the mythology that the industry is "competitive."
The prophylactic of antitrust seems to have a psychological effect upon corporate
management strategy which dissuades aggressive behavior upon smaller, weaker ri-
vals, at least where a single firm is highly visible because of its relative size and
market dominance. For example, IBM has always tolerated the presence of smaller
firms in the computer market although it has abundant resources to crush them. So
too, AT&T will likely tolerate the presence of MCI and Sprint (so long as their
market shares are modest) so as not to attract the wrecking ball of antitrust.
336. CONSUMER REPORT ON DIVESTITURE supra note 259, at 9.
337. It may come in the form of cable TV connections, "Dick Tracy" two-way
radio wrist watches, or satellite dishes on our roofs.
338. Moreover, FCC rulings and certain forms of technology may make competi-
tive entry even less likely. The Federal Communications Commission has recently
proposed that the regional telephone companies be allowed to purchase firms in the
one industry that promises to eventually provide a competitive alternative to the
local telephone monopoly-television cable service. Dubroff, FCC Plan Allows
Phone Firms to Own Local Cable Companies, Rocky Mountain News, July 21, 1988,
at 1C. By owning the local cable companies, the local telephone companies can as-
sure that this competitive threat never emerges. As to technology, the day will come
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Some commentators insist that both local exchange and in-
terexchange services are, indeed, natural monopolies. 339  If,
when the dust settles, the smaller rivals have been driven
from the business, divestiture and deregulation, socially and
economically, will have been a costly and futile experiment.
The fact remains that telecommunications is not an environ-
ment of perfect competition. At best, long-distance is an oli-
gopoly and may well be a natural monopoly. Local service is a
monopoly, and probably a natural monopoly. A deregulated
monopoly would maximize wealth by raising prices well above
marginal costs and reducing levels of service. Distortions in
the pricing system would create inefficiency in the allocation
of society's resources, and produce an inevitable wealth trans-
fer. Thus, there remains an important and essential role for
government to play.340
F. A Fully Deregulated Telecommunications Industry
The empirical results described in this section are the prod-
uct of AT&T's divestiture and the partial deregulation of the
when our homes are linked to the telecommunications network by fiber optic cables.
There are fewer competitive alternatives to a local fiber optic network than the ex-
isting copper lines. Wenner, supra note 233.
339. Exchange telephone service and interexchange service have an even
more basic claim to being natural monopolies than does the supply of water
and gas. That claim is based on the interactive character of both services.
Every telephone in every exchange must be able to call and be called by
every other telephone in that exchange and in every other exchange. They
can do that economically only if they share a common switch or system of
switches. The cost advantage of service interactive terminals through one
network rather than through two or more may change with changing tech-
nology. Always, though, assuming there are no barriers to its exercise, that
cost advantage is there. It is intrinsic. Exchange service and interexchange
service are intrinsically natural monopolies. Especially in the provision of
local service, regulation may have made local service a natural monopoly by
discouraging experimentation in service delivery and supporting monopoli-
zation of services.
A. VON Auw, HERITAGE AND DESTINY: REFLECTIONS ON THE BELL SYSTEM IN TRANSI-
TION 235 (1983).
340. Professor Harry Trebing put it this way:
[T]he need for government intervention exists because industrialized socie-
ties give rise to concentrations of power, increased uncertainty, performance
failures, uncompensated costs, and adverse distributional effects. In many
sectors, markets are not self-correcting and are incapable of assuring an ad-
equate supply of goods and services at least cost, nor can they constrain
abuses associated with the unequal distribution of power. Some form of reg-
ulation is needed to correct these malfunctions.
Trebing, supra note 169, at 1714.
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telecommunications system. No doubt, the pace of the trends
identified here would be accelerated with full deregulation.
Imagine, for a moment, a Libertarian paradise in which
there is no government, and telephone companies can do as
they please. A rational profit maximizing monopolist would
likely raise prices and reduce service. The owners of the "bot-
tlenecks" could turn them into gold mines by raising both the
access charges of long-distance carriers, and raising the rates
of local residential customers. Only two things might con-
strain them-large numbers of residential users might drop
off the system because they can no longer afford it or signifi-
cant bypass may actually emerge. Arguably, residential users
who pay $40 a month for cable television would likely find the
money to keep their telephones. And economies of scale,
scope, and density make significant bypass of local service un-
likely, unless some new technological breakthrough changes
that.
Large companies could also maximize their wealth by aban-
doning the large rural areas that are unprofitable. Smaller
telephone companies, which serve some of these remote areas,
would likely go bankrupt without some revenue infusion from
urban customers, and with the loss of their few volume cus-
tomers to the larger RBOCs. RBOCs would be free to discrim-
inate in favor of these larger customers.
It might even be possible for an RBOC to have long-distance
companies bid for the exclusive rights to serve its customers.
One need only look at what the television networks now pay
to have the exclusive rights to broadcast a single sports event
to have some idea of what a long-distance company would pay
for the opportunity to be the sole firm providing long-distance
service in a heavily populated, multi-state area.
The long-distance firms would likely engage in cut-throat
competition, until the dominant carrier or two goes "belly up."
AT&T would not tolerate the nuisance of smaller competitive
carriers if it were free to raid its customers with discrimina-
tory prices.
However, if the RBOCs were free to enter the long-distance
market, the incumbent long-distance firms would be in dire
straits, because the RBOCs have both the economic resources
and the stranglehold on the local "bottleneck" to destroy the
opposition. During these wars for market dominance, quality
would suffer, and users might have to subscribe to several dif-
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ferent systems to reach the entire nation. In the short term,
pricing for those customers who have competitive choices
might be reasonable. But in the long-run, after the shakeout
had driven weaker firms from the market, the giant firms
would extract monopoly profits.
VI
The Need for a National Telecommunications
Policy A.D. (After Divestiture)
The disarray of having national telecommunications policy
developed by the schizophrenic assault of the Justice Depart-
ment, a federal judge, a highly ideological FCC, and a mean-
dering Congress has created a chaotic political, legal,
regulatory, and economic environment. Moreover, there is a
myopia as to what the future will bring. Blind faith in the
theology of laissez faire is hardly conducive to constructing a
coherent public policy. Communications is too important an
infrastructure industry to leave it twisting in the wind, and to
rig temporary solutions to crises as they erupt. Congress must
have the wisdom and fortitude to fulfill its constitutional mis-
sion to regulate interstate commerce,3 41 addressing telecom-
munications issues with carefully conceived and long overdue
amendments to the Communications Act of 1934. If American
enterprise is to be competitive in a global economy, we must
have a public telecommunications network which enhances
the socio-economic development of the nation, particularly
now, as we enter the Information Age.a42
Economic regulation can fulfill the public's need to have a
neutral arbiter in disputes between consumers who need af-
fordable telecommunications services and monopolists provid-
ing essential infrastructure services. It can ensure that great
341. Article 1, § 8 of the Constitution vests in Congress the power to regulate
interstate and foreign commerce.
342. In a growing number of countries, national policies reflect the belief
that a modern telecommunications infrastructure is vital to the develop-
ment and performance of modern financial and information service indus-
tries. These industries are seen as central to future GNP, employment and
income growth. Telecommunications infrastructure is also seen as essential
in supporting international trade activities and modern manufacturing sys-
tems. Nations with modern public networks will enjoy a significant edge in
the race for leadership in these sectors.
W. Davidson, Telecommunications Policy in Global Perspective 11 (unpublished pa-
per 1987).
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disparities in wealth or power are neutralized. To the extent
that market problems such as monopoly (natural or not) exist,
the consumer needs the assistance of government to level the
playing field, so he is not exploited by the greed of the mono-
polist selling an essential service.343 Where competition is
neither presently available nor likely soon to emerge, eco-
nomic regulation must be preserved to protect the consumer
from exploitation. 3 4 To the extent that certain sectors of tele-
communications remain a monopoly or an oligopoly, regula-
tion must be retained to ensure that the profit maximization
imperative does not manifest itself in the extraction of mono-
poly profits.345
Full deregulation is not yet a responsible option.346 We need
improved regulation by enlightened regulatory agencies, with
a strong statutory mission to facilitate the wide availability of
usable, affordable, efficiently produced, and technologically
advanced telecommunications services.
Protection against market failure is not the only reason for
economic regulation. The important public policies of univer-
sal service, technological development, a seamless network,
and an efficient telecommunications industry can be advanced
by sensible governmental oversight.
A. Universal Service
We should begin by borrowing what is best from the rubble
343. See Dempsey, supra note 35, at 15-18. "[R]egulators cannot abandon their
statutory responsibilities to regulate essential communications or information serv-
ices on merely the promise of durable competition. We must see clear evidence that
the discipline of the market place is working and sustainable." Schwartz, supra note
37, at 32 (emphasis in original). Residential users are like flies on flypaper. In an
unregulated environment, many could not be shaken from the system no matter
how poor service became, or how high prices climbed.
. 344. Pricing for captive telephone customers should not be implemented in a
manner which allows the firm to cross-subsidize its predatory battles to retain or
expand market share in competitive markets. Consumers without a realistic alterna-
tive should not subsidize competitive services.
345. The combined effect of high levels of concentration, differentiated mar-
kets, retaliatory power of incumbent firms, demand/supply imbalances, and
the difficulty of setting neutral pricing guidelines indicates clearly that ac-
celerated deregulation will not result in high levels of competition in the
energy and telecommunications industries. Rather oligopolistic market
structures will emerge that are conducive to significant inefficiencies and
adverse distributional effects.
Trebing, supra note 321, at 627.
346. Id. at 627-28.
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of the old regime. 'Universal service-the notion that high
quality service should be ubiquitously available and reasonably
priced throughout the nation, in urban as well as rural com-
munities-is an important public benefit which should be pre-
served. This means that some cross-subsidies must be retained
for the poor, and those located in the high-cost regions of the
rural hinterland.
Neoclassical economists will undoubtedly protest on alloca-
tive efficiency grounds; but there are solid social and economic
reasons for maintaining a subsidy. To begin with, the benefits
of universal accessibility ought to be borne by all who benefit
from it. Why shouldn't business users and telemarketing
firms pay more than residential customers? Commercial en-
terprises enjoy a significant benefit from having access to con-
sumers, and they recognize it, as evidenced by the enormous
revenue spent on Yellow Pages and newspaper advertisements
that include a telephone number. 47 The telephone is the
means by which many sales are made. The seller should pay
for the benefit of this broadened market for the sale of his
goods or services, and the reduction of transaction costs pro-
vided by the telecommunications system. And why shouldn't
the long-distance caller also pay a premium to have access to
the local market? Is it a cross-subsidy at all, or merely an ad-
ditional cost reflecting the significant benefit derived from ac-
cess? We must reject the simplistic notion that only one who
originates a call derives a benefit from it, and should shoulder
all its costs. We all enjoy an intrinsic benefit from having ac-
cess to everyone else in the nation, for we just might want to
talk to them, even if they cannot afford to pay the purported
direct cost of the service.
Additionally, there are external costs borne by those living
in small or impoverished communities from inferior, expen-
sive or nonexistent telephone service. Small communities will
have a more difficult time attracting new investment (or in-
deed, dissuading existing businesses from leaving). This would
exacerbate the plight of rural poverty and the migration of
youth to congested urban areas. The pockets of archaic tech-
nological facilities emerging since divestiture are being left be-
hind as the rest of the nation enters the 21st century.
Universal access to communications and information services
347. See supra note 133 and accompanying text.
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demands a reliable, sophisticated, ubiquitous, and reasonably
priced telecommunications system.348
Moreover, rising residential rates may leave the impover-
ished without medical or police assistance during emergencies.
Even if one should, using rather rigid calculations of cost, con-
clude that allocative efficiency is being jeopardized by these
subsidies, universal service can be justified on social welfare
grounds.
In order to maintain cross-subsidies in the pricing structure,
regulatory entry constraints and antitrust immunity should be
conferred to shield the system from "cream skimming." If in-
trastate toll revenues are to contribute to cross-subsidies, then
entry should be limited here as well. Indeed, toll offers a
greater base over which to spread costs. Moreover, entry pro-
tection will relieve carriers of the incentive to discriminate in
favor of larger users of the system. Pricing and service dis-
crimination between similarly situated users should, in gen-
eral, be prohibited. To the extent that uneconomic bypass can
be avoided, widespread rate de-averaging should be avoided.
Exit should also be regulated. It would be antithetical to
the policy of universal service to allow a carrier to abandon
the markets that rely on it to provide access to the nation. 49
B. Technological Development
Many nations realize that investment in the telecommunica-
tions infrastructure will enable the creation of a superior
public network 350 capable of stimulating growth in financial,
information, manufacturing, and logistical sectors.35 1  Al-
though AT&T and the seven RBOCs invest more than 75% of
their operating cash flow in network facilities, as a percentage
of sales, that amount is only half of what is invested by Japa-
348. D. Miglio, supra note 33, at 7.
349. If there is a desirable social policy to be achieved in assuring adequate tele-
phone service and reasonable prices to small towns and rural communities, entry
and exit regulation must be retained. Telephone companies should be prohibited
from abandoning less lucrative portions of their service territories. And if we expect
the small, independent telephone compainies to continue providing quality service to
small towns and rural communities, entry regulation must be retained so as to pre-
vent larger firms from "cream skimming" their most lucrative customers.
350. "A modern network exhibits digital, high-speed broad-band, and multi-proto-
cal capabilities in a universal service environment." W. Davidson, supra note 342, at
3.
351. Id. at 9.
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nese and Singaporean companies.352 If the United States is to
remain competitive in a global economy, we must increase our
investment in telecommunications technology and hardware.
America should encourage technological progress; a healthy
competitive environment for equipment and information mar-
kets will best satisfy that objective. These markets should be
open to competitive entry for all but the RBOCs, whose partic-
ipation therein would likely stultify its growth.5 3 Telephone
companies should be "common carriers" in the strictest sense,
involved in transport rather than content, and providing fair
and open access to all users. 54 Vendors of new products (in-
cluding Bell Labs and Western Electric) should have tax in-
centives to invest in research and development. 55 Local and
regional telephone companies themselves should have regula-
tory and tax incentives to purchase new technology from com-
petitive vendors and bring it on line expeditiously. And
consumers should have an array of compatible information
services from which to choose.
That is not to say that we need to wastefully add expensive
352. Id. at 2.
353. Until technology breaks through the natural monopoly of the local loop "bot-
tleneck," the BOCs must be prohibited from entering the long-distance market, for
the incentives to discriminate between competitive long-distance carriers, and en-
gage in other anticompetitive activity are the same that lead to the MFJ. Restric-
tions against equipment manufacturing by BOCs must be retained for similar
reasons. As Assistant Attorney General Charles Rule noted, rate-of-return regula-
tion may be subverted as the monopolist integrates upstream and pays inflated
prices for goods and services produced by its subsidiaries. Moreover, "the bottleneck
monopolist also may be able to reap anticompetitive returns through a strategy of
providing discriminatory access to its bottleneck." C. Rule, Antitrust and Bottleneck
Monopolies: The Lessons of the AT&T Decree 9-10 (address before the Brookings
Institution, Oct. 5, 1988).
354. In fact, the telephone companies should be prohibited from entering non-
communications ventures as well, for the losses they incur not only jeopardize the
economic integrity of the telephone system, they distract management from their
principal mission-to satisfy the nation's need for efficient and high quality commu-
nications services. See Spievack, supra note 131, at 13-14.
But if telephone companies are allowed to enter non-communications business
ventures, telephone rate payers should be shielded from the economic losses in-
curred by imprudent diversification. And if the telephone rate payers are to suffer
the risk of having their rates increased by the imprudent investment decisions of
telephone company managers, then they should share the profits in these new ven-
tures in the form of rate rebates.
355. Another concern must be how to preserve that vast national resource of
technological innovation, Bell Labs. The competitive pressures unleashed by the
market penetration of MCI and Sprint on AT&T must inevitably diminish its ability
to provide the generous long-term R&D support it has traditionally provided.
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equipment or excessive capacity, a problem emerging in long-
distance markets with the laying of parallel fiber optic sys-
tems by AT&T, MCI, and Sprint.356 As Professor Trebing
notes, "To minimize excess capacity, the telecommunications
systems could be compelled to interconnect and establish a
system for renting capacity that would mitigate, at least in
part, the need to replicate rival networks.
' 357
Some of what is suggested here has been adopted by the
Federal Republic of Germany, which has fully liberalized the
terminal equipment market, while retaining a network mo-
nopoly to ensure preservation of a uniform network infra-
structure and to assure that all regions have access to
information.358
C. A Seamless Network
Traditionally, AT&T provided standardization of equipment
and technology specifications in telecommunications, and IBM
provided them in computers. Standardization enhances the
seamlessness of the system. The communications network
should remain seamless, so that everything works effortlessly
from the perspective of the consumer. Maximum interconnec-
tivity and a lubricated transmission system are essential pre-
requisites of seamlessness. Antitrust immunity should be
conferred upon competitors which seek to preserve that uni-
formity in standards previously provided by Bell. Where nec-
essary, the FCC should provide standards and specifications,
not to stultify competition, but to avoid the telecommunica-
tions infrastructure from becoming a Tower of Babel.
We need to direct some attention to the tremendous invest-
ment being made in private and corporate systems which are
redundant and often incompatible with the public system.359
356. Trebing, supra note 321, at 625.
357. Trebing, supra note 169, at 1732.
358. Terminal paths and their termination points are shielded from competition
in West Germany. However, satellite communications and mobile radio networks
are being liberalized. B. ZURHORST, THE SHAPING OF A NEW GERMAN TELECOMMUNI-
CATIONS POLICY 3 (1988).
359. Already, major corporations are creating private communications systems
more sophisticated than, and often incompatible with, the public network. See W.
Davidson, supra note 342, at 28-30. It also appears that "[t]he telephone companies'
enhanced services are geared solely to the demands of a handful of large corporate
customers and institutional customers.... ." Spievack, supra note 131, at 15. Regula-
tory means must be advanced which have as an objective the retention of major data
flows on the public network, and the encouragement of technological and informa-
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Regulatory agencies must create incentives for telecommuni-
cation companies to redirect investment into the primary net-
work, and to encourage public network modernization. A
single, accessible national communications and information
system will enhance national economic growth in the Informa-
tion Age.
D. An Efficient Telecommunications Industry
Regulation should be administered in a way that encourages
productivity and efficiency in the regulated industry. Incen-
tive regulation, adopted by a number of states, offers an en-
lightened mechanism for encouraging regulated firms to be
more efficient, because to the extent they can reduce costs,
they are allowed to increase their profits. Requiring a regu-
lated firm to share its profits with consumers above a desig-
nated threshold stimulates productivity, while diminishing the
regressive nature of the wealth transfer from consumers to
stockholders of the regulated monopoly. But to the extent
such regulatory mechanisms are utilized to spur efficiency, the
firm's activities must be monitered to ensure that cost-cutting
does not jeopardize the quality of service.
On the whole, regulatory agencies should refrain from in-
truding too vigorously into the affairs of the telecommunica-
tion companies, so as to reduce the transaction costs of
regulation, and to allow market demand to govern the flow of
capital and technology, consonant with social needs. For ex-
ample, inflation-adjusted price ceilings and floors are prefera-
ble to strict regulation of each and every tariff modification.
Responsible and enlightened regulation at the margins, setting
the metes and bounds of performance, while allowing market
incentives to encourage efficiency and productivity, is prefera-
ble to rigid, heavy-handed regulation.
tional compatibility so that the largest number of potential users can access the sys-
tem. Small users must have the same access as large corporations.
[Vol. 11:527
1989] TELECOMMUNICATIONS DEREGULATION POLICY 603
vii
Conclusion: The Prospectus for
Telecommunications Regulation
A. All The King's Horses Cannot put the Bell System Back
Together Again
It would have been difficult for contemporary national tele-
communications policy to have developed in a more poorly
orchestrated manner. Congressional and FCC impotency al-
lowed a federal district court judge to assume the role of na-
tional communications "czar." As AT&T Chairman Brown
put the question, "Is there not a more rational way to shape
public policy for an industry that is such a critical part of the
nation's social and economic infrastructure?""s
As consumers have had more experience with deregulation,
they have become less enamored with it. Deregulation of
other major infrastructure industries such as airlines,
railroads, motor carriers, and bus companies has led to wide-
spread criticism of industry concentration,36 ' service deteriora-
tion,36 2 and pricing discrimination.363 But criticism is growing
360. Quoted in W. TURNSTALL, supra note 40, at 191.
361. See generally Dempsey, Antitrust Law & Policy in Transportation, Monop-
oly 1$ the Name of the Game, 21 GA. L. REV. 505 (1987); Dempsey, With Deregula-
tion, Big Get Bigger, Philadelphia Inquirer, Dec. 19, 1987, at 9A; Ward, U.S. Airlines
Buffeted by Deregulation, Toronto Star, Nov. 22, 1987, at 1; Dempsey, Deregulation's
First Decade, J. of Com., Dec. 17, 1987, at 8A; Dempsey, Reagan's Sad Transportation
Legacy, Houston Chron., Apr. 10, 1988, at 6; Stockton, When Eight Carriers Call the
Shots, N.Y. Times, Nov. 20, 1988, at 3, col. 2; Rowen, Airline Deregulation at 10: Did
the Theory Fail?, Washington Post, Oct. 16, 1988, at HI, col. 2; Dempsey, Competition
Is a Flop; Protect the Public, USA Today, Nov. 23, 1988, at 12A, col. 4.
362. See generally Dempsey, Transportation Deregulation-On a Collision
Course?, 13 TRANSP. L.J. 329 (1984); Dempsey, Fear of Flying Frequently, NEWS-
WEEK, Oct. 5, 1987, at 12; Dempsey, Consumers Pay More to Receive a Lot Less, USA
Today, July 16, 1987, at 8A, col. 5; Dempsey, The Carnage of Airline Deregulation,
Houston Chron., July 30, 1987, at 27; Rowen, Re-Regulate the Airlines, Washington
Post, Aug. 19, 1987, at A23, col. 5; Dempsey, Cross Your Fingers, Hope Not to Die,
Chicago Trib., Aug. 28, 1987, at 28; Rowen, The Extra Maintenance Dollar, Washing-
ton Post, May 5, 1988, at A23, col. 2; Dempsey, Deregulation Has Spawned Abuses in
Air Transport, Av. WEEK & SPACE TECH., Nov. 21, 1988, at 147.
363. See generally Dempsey, The Dark Side of Deregulation: Its Impact On Small
Communities, 39 ADMIN. L. REV. 445 (1987); Dempsey, The Deregulation of Intra-
state Transportation: The Texas Debate, 39 BAYLOR L. REV. 1 (1987); Dempsey, Rate
Regulation and Antitrust Immunity in Transportation: The Genesis and Evolution
of This Endangered Species, 32 AM. U.L. REV. 335 (1983); Dempsey, Punishing
Smallness, Cleveland Plain Dealer, Dec. 12, 1987, at 15-A; Dempsey, Life Since De-
regulation: It Means Paying Much More for Much Less, Des Moines Reg., Dec. 30,
1987, at 24.
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here as well. The political high water mark of deregulation
may well be behind us.3" 4
Moreover, the evidence from abroad is not particularly en-
couraging. In 1979, Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher priva-
tized the sole British telephone company, licensed new
entrants, and embraced deregulation. And yet, the results are
far from the ideal of perfect competition: "the average phone
service is as bad as it was eight years ago. The phone manu-
facturing industry is still in decline. And for all the govern-
ment's free-market rhetoric, it still allows ... the former state
phone company to dominate the market. '365
When all the dust settles, if our grand experiment in divesti-
ture and deregulation on this side of the Atlantic turns out to
be as anemic in result, then we will have blindly perpetrated
an unfortunate tragedy. All the King's horses, and all the
King's men, cannot now put the Bell System back together
again. Her dismembered body consists of amputated limbs
strewn across the land.366 Ma Bell was a dear old friend. Hav-
ing so brutally dismembered her, we no longer deserve her
kindly matriarchal interest in our well-being.
B. The Greenehouse Effect: A Telecommunications Czar and a
Thousand Flowers Blooming in the States
Deregulation was ostensibly intended as a means of increas-
364. There seems to be a growing backlash against deregulation. See Govern-
ment's Role May Soon Grow Again, Wall St. J., Dec. 12, 1988, at 1, col. 7; Waldman,
Regulation Comes Back, NEWSWEEK, Sept. 12, 1988, at 44; Adams & Brock, Reaga-
nomics and the Transmogrification of Merger Policy, ANTITRUST BULL. 309 (Sum-
mer 1988).
365. Hudson, Britain's Telephone Deregulation Fails To Revive Industry or Spur
Competition, Wall St. J., Mar. 5, 1987, at 32, col. 1.
366. One careful observer of these events is W. Brooke Turnstall, who sadly
noted:
I believe that regulation in the telecommunications industry served the na-
tion well for the better part of this century; that technological innovation,
while calling for change, did not inexorably dictate full-scale competition
; that . .. the integrated nationwide network should have been pre-
served; that the government's charge of past or potential "abuse of size and
power" was a hollow argument; that wise legislation could have been en-
acted to preserve the network and update legislative powers ....
I cannot escape a sense of the profound loss to the nation involved in the
dismantling of the integrated network-nor can I escape the conviction that
it is a loss that could have been avoided by more far-sighted public
policymaking.
W. TURNSTALL, supra note 40, at 194.
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ing competition in the telecommunications industry. 67 The in-
dustry, however, continues to be partially regulated. Today
the FCC, the state public utility commissions, and Judge
Greene all play a regulating role.368 If things are a mess now,
at least part of the blame has to fall on the confused pattern of
divestiture, regulation and partial deregulation.369 The ab-
sence of a rational and coherent telecommunications policy in-
hibits prudent business planning and significantly increases
transaction costs.
Congress should step forward and fulfill its constitutional
obligations by seizing the reins of national telecommunications
policy, and promulgating legislation amending and updating
the Communications Act of 1934, providing carefully consid-
ered policy objectives, and responsible regulatory means for
their implementation.7 0
On the face of it, having a plethora of different communica-
367. See id. at 112. See also S. COLL, supra note 17, at 367.
368. See Weisman, Transition to Telecommunications Competition Amid
Residual Regulatory Obligations, PUB. UTIL. FORT., Aug. 6, 1987, at 14, 15. At the
federal level, the FCC has authority over carriers and rates involving interstate ser-
vice. At the state level, the Public Utility Commissions (PUCs) govern carriers that
provide service within their states, as well as the rates for intrastate service. A PUC
can significantly influence what consumers pay for telephone services; it can grant
licenses or certificates for telephone services and can also limit the number of com-
peting companies that provide telephone service. Zielinski, supra note 293, at 102-03.
369. For a number of years, the regional Bell companies have had the capability
to offer such information services as "voice mail," a way of storing, sending, and
receiving spoken messages, at relatively low cost. However, regulators have pre-
vented them from doing so in the interest of a competition that has not materialized.
Within the next decade, telephone companies could provide more than 100% times
their current, service-carrying capacity and offer a broad range of revolutionary new
services. Regulatory constraints and lack of incentive to take risks on such invest-
ments, though, are preventing them from doing so. Judge Greene gave the compa-
nies freedom to use their networks to distribute information services provided by
other companies and has allowed them to enter non-telecommunications businesses.
However, he still prohibits them from manufacturing equipment and providing long-
distance services. Wenner, supra note 233.
370. Rather than address these troublesome and important issues, FCC
Chairman Mark Fowler... called for the total deregulation of the telecom-
munications industry. Although such regulatory abdication is absolutely in-
appropriate as long as the RBOCs enjoy a monopoly over the local
exchange, the FCC's track record of protecting consumers and promoting
independent, nonphone company competition over the past few years does
not leave one with any confidence in the commission's future course.
Spievack, supra note 131, at 16.
Economist Roger Noll also characterized the Reagan FCC as a highly ideological
institution: "Today the FCC deregulates as fast as it can without causing a pro-regu-
latory backlash in Congress. Political feasibility now appears to be the binding con-
straint." Noll, supra note 232, at 17.
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tion policies declared by Public Utility Commissions of the
fifty states and District of Columbia, the FCC, the DOJ, and
Judge Harold Greene is hardly suited to achieving a rational,
coherent scheme of national telecommunications policy. But
until Congress acts, what approach should we take in the in-
terim? If the FCC were a more responsible and ideological
body, we could rely on it to establish national telecommunica-
tions policy. As indicated above, since divestiture, Judge
Greene has taken a more pragmatic approach than that advo-
cated by the DOJ and the FCC. For now, the reins are in his
hands. And for now, at least, they should be.
The day will come when it is apparent that partial preemp-
tion of the states will be desirable in order to achieve a unified
national telecommunications policy.371 But that day is not yet
here. For the moment, let the states continue to experiment
with different mixtures of laissez faire and economic regula-
tion. They will serve as greenhouses where we can observe
the empirical results of a multitude of approaches. In the
short term, let a thousand flowers bloom, so that Congress can
soon harvest those pedigrees which are most beautiful, and
plant them in legislation amending and updating the Commu-
nications Act of 1934.
371. The federal government regulates interstate telecommunications (in-
cluding customer equipment used for interstate services) and anything that
uses the electromagnetic spectrum. The states regulate services that oper-
ate solely within their boundaries. Technically and economically, this juris-
dictional separation is artificial; even in a competitive world it would be
very costly to maintain completely separate facilities for providing national
and local services. Indeed, much of the inefficiency created by regulation
results from the elaborate accounting and regulatory processes invented to
implement jurisdictional separations.
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